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AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION OF
JUDICIAL DECISIONMAKING,
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, AND THE
CHEVRON DOCTRINE IN
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
JASON J. CZARNEZKI*
How do courts evaluate decisions of statutory interpreta-
tion made by government agencies that deal in environ-
mental law? While research on judicial decisionmaking in
environmental law has primarily focused on the D.C. Cir-
cuit, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the influence
of ideology, only recently have legal scholars begun to con-
sider the role of legal factors in judicial decisionmaking in
environmental law. With special attention paid to how
courts implement the Chevron doctrine, this Article empiri-
cally and doctrinally analyzes environmental law cases de-
cided in the United States Courts of Appeals over a three-
year period (2003-05) to investigate what factors, including
ideological, legal, and institutional variables, impact judi-
cial review of administrative agency interpretations of envi-
ronmental statutes.
INTRODUCTION
How do the United States Courts of Appeals decide envi-
ronmental cases? More specifically, how do courts evaluate the
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decisions of statutory interpretation made by government
agencies that deal in environmental and natural resources law,
such as the United States Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA"), Army Corps of Engineers, and the Department of the
Interior? While research on judicial decisionmaking in envi-
ronmental law has primarily focused on the D.C. Circuit, the
EPA, and the influence of ideology, l legal scholars have re-
cently begun to consider the role of legal factors in judicial de-
cisionmaking in environmental law. 2 More can be learned
about environmental jurisprudence by looking outside the Dis-
trict of Columbia, to other environmental agencies, and to the
influence of legal interpretive approaches and legal doctrine-
as opposed to ideology-in environmental law cases. 3
A number of factors influence judicial interpretation of en-
vironmental law. To lawyers and most legal scholars, law itself
is the most obvious influence. In environmental cases, judges
may look to any number of interpretive tools including the
statute's underlying purpose, legislative history, and plain
meaning of the text. 4 Of great significance, administrative
law's Chevron doctrine has transformed judicial review of
agency interpretations of federal statutes. The doctrine, laid
down by the United States Supreme Court in Chevron U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,5 now the most
cited case in all American law, 6 permits extreme deference to
administrative agencies if statutory provisions are ambiguous. 7
Chevron is considered one of the country's most important en-
1. See, e.g., Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the
D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717 (1997); Cass R. Sunstein, David Schkade & Lisa
Michelle Ellman, Ideological Voting on Federal Courts of Appeals: A Preliminary
Investigation, 90 VA. L. REV. 301, 322 (2004) (stating that their investigation was
limited to the D.C. Circuit).
2. See, e.g., Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regula-
tory Policy? An Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 847-65
(2006).
3. See Martha Anne Humphries & Donald R. Songer, Law and Politics in
Judicial Oversight of Federal Administrative Agencies, 61 J. POL. 207, 212 (1999)
("A major impediment to empirical attempts to assess the impact of the legal
model on appellate court decision making has been the difficulty of identifying ob-
jective indicators that capture the effects of law and precedent.").
4. See infra Part I.A.1.
5. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
6. Miles & Sunstein, supra note 2, at 823 ("In the past quarter century, the
Supreme Court has legitimated agency authority to interpret regulatory legisla-
tion, above all in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc,
the most cited case in modern public law.").
7. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
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vironmental law cases, and it is included in most environ-
mental law casebooks.8
These legal factors elicit a number of questions. Do invo-
cations of certain interpretive tools or standards of review lead
to pro- or anti-environmental outcomes? In environmental
cases, do judges strategically use the Chevron doctrine, because
of its potential malleability, to achieve their perceived envi-
ronmental policy preferences? While no data are available to
answer the first question, recent data suggest the answer to
the second inquiry may be in the affirmative. 9
Meanwhile, for political scientists and, more recently, some
legal scholars, ideology plays the most salient role in judicial
decisionmaking.10 The available data suggest that ideology
significantly influences judicial decisionmaking in environ-
mental cases on the D.C. Circuit. "1 For example, the data sug-
gest that judges appointed by Democratic administrations tend
to vote against challenges to EPA regulations, whereas Repub-
lican appointees are far less likely to do so. 12
Employing both empirical and traditional doctrinal analy-
sis, this Article considers environmental law cases decided in
the United States Courts of Appeals over a three-year period
(2003-05) to describe and investigate what factors, including
ideological, legal, and institutional variables, impact judicial
review of administrative agency interpretations of environ-
mental statutes. Part I of this Article discusses judicial review
of agency interpretation of environmental law. Part II dis-
8. See, e.g., FREDERICK R. ANDERSON ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION:
LAW AND POLICY 151 (3d ed. 1999); ROBIN KUNDIS CRAIG, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
IN CONTEXT 628 (2005); DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 435 (7th ed. 2006).
9. Miles & Sunstein, supra note 2, at 823 (analyzing appellate court deci-
sions from 1990 to 2004, and finding that "Republican appointees demonstrated a
greater willingness to invalidate liberal agency decisions [than] those of Democ-
ratic administrations").
10. See JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DAVID SCHKADE,
LISA M. ELLMAN & ANDRES SAWICKI, ARE JUDGES POLITICAL?: AN EMPIRICAL
ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2006). For a brief discussion of the legal
versus attitudinal model, see Jason J. Czarnezki & William K. Ford, The Phantom
Philosophy? An Empirical Investigation of Legal Interpretation, 65 MD. L. REV.
841,847-55 (2006).
11. Revesz, supra note 1, at 1719.
12. Sunstein, Schkade & Ellman, supra note 1, at 322-23 ("From 1970
through 2002, Democratic appointees voted against agency challenges 64% of the
time, whereas Republican appointees did so 46% of the time.").
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cusses in more detail the empirical scholarship on judicial deci-
sionmaking in environmental and administrative law, focusing
on the role of the legal and attitudinal models, as well as insti-
tutional constraints on the judicial process. Part III explains
the data and methodology for this study, while Part IV contains
findings that describe the environmental law docket in the fed-
eral courts of appeals, provides information on how the docket
is divided across the circuits and agencies, and states which
environmental statutes are at issue in the courts. Part IV also
analyzes how the courts of appeals decide environmental cases
where agencies have interpreted the underlying federal stat-
ute, considering the role of ideology and the strategic use of the
Chevron doctrine. Part V provides a doctrinal analysis of how
courts have used, sometimes with much difficulty, available
standards of review in evaluating agency interpretations of en-
vironmental statutes. Part V also discusses the relationship
between the need for scientific expertise in environmental
cases and the level of judicial deference.
Relying on empirical analysis and descriptive data, this
Article finds that environmental cases of statutory interpreta-
tion, usually litigated in the D.C., Second, and Ninth Circuits,
are dominated by EPA involvement and interpretation of the
Clean Air and Clean Water Acts. This Article's findings con-
firm earlier research that judges vote in their perceived ideo-
logical direction; the findings also show the Chevron doctrine,
when employed in environmental cases, works as expected-
courts find most statutory provisions ambiguous and then af-
firm agency action. There is limited evidence that judges stra-
tegically use Chevron step one to achieve desired policy prefer-
ences-at the ideological extremes, conservatives deferred to
Bush Administration agencies under Chevron step two, while
liberals were more likely to reverse the agency by finding the
statute unambiguous under step one. Legal preferences, how-
ever, do play some role in judicial decisionmaking, although not
necessarily to achieve an individual judge's policy preferences.
Invoking legislative history mildly corresponds to a liberal vote,
yet judicial ideology does not predict its invocation, suggesting
a legal philosophy toward legislative history actually impacts
voting outcomes and lending support for the legal model of ju-
dicial decisionmaking.
This Article also makes a number of qualitative findings.
Doctrinally, there remains much confusion and conflation in
[Vol. 79
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the circuits over how to apply the Chevron doctrine, manifested
through poor opinion organization, befuddlement over the ap-
plication of Chevron step zero, and multiple understandings of
the difference between arbitrary and capricious review and the
two Chevron steps. The circuits have shown, however, a strong
willingness to defer, under any doctrine or framework, to
agency action when environmental scientific expertise is re-
quired. Ultimately, this Article suggests the existence of a
more nuanced notion of judging in environmental cases that
depends upon policy preferences, interpretive philosophies,
standards of review, and scientific complexity.
I. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AGENCY INTERPRETATIONS OF
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Strong synergies exist between environmental law and
administrative law. While Chevron creates the standard for
deference to administrative agencies, it also is an important
case in environmental law. In addition, environmental cases
play a major role in administrative law casebooks and in devel-
oping the processes under which courts review all agency deci-
sions. 13 This Part describes how (and when, pursuant to Mead)
courts review agency interpretations of environmental statutes
using the Chevron doctrine, the Administrative Procedure Act,
and other forms of deference.
A. The Chevron Doctrine in Environmental Law
In Chevron, Justice Stevens, 14 writing for the majority of
the Court, stated:
13. There is significant case crossover between both environmental and ad-
ministrative law casebooks. For example, a number of cases are included in both
ROBERT V. PERCIVAL, CHRISTOPHER H. SCHROEDER, ALAN S. MILLER & JAMES P.
LEAPE, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY (5th ed. 2006),
and STEPHEN G. BREYER, RICHARD B. STEWART, CASS R. SUNSTEIN & MATTHEW L.
SPITZER, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY: PROBLEMS, TEXT, AND
CASES (5th ed. 2002). E.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001);
Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687
(1995); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984); Indus. Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst. (The Benzene Case),
448 U.S. 607 (1980); Am. Water Works v. EPA, 40 F.3d 1266 (D.C. Cir. 1994);
Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA., 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991).
14. For further discussion of Justice Stevens's jurisprudence in environmental
law and statutory interpretation, see Diane L. Hughes, Justice Stevens's Method
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When a court reviews an agency's construction of the stat-
ute which it administers, it is confronted with two ques-
tions. First, always, is the question whether Congress has
directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent
of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the
court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambi-
guously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court
determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise
question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own
construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the
absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the
statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific is-
sue, the question for the court is whether the agency's an-
swer is based on a permissible construction of the statute. 15
This two-part test revolutionized judicial review of agency
interpretations of substantive federal law, especially in the en-
vironmental context.
1. Chevron Step One
The Chevron opinion itself is the product of an environ-
mental case dealing with an EPA interpretation of the Clean
Air Act. The issue in Chevron was whether the EPA's "decision
to allow States to treat all of the pollution-emitting devices
within the same industrial grouping as though they were en-
cased within a single 'bubble' is based on a reasonable con-
struction of the statutory term 'stationary source"' as defined in
the Clean Air Act ("CAA"). 16 The Court held, in light of the
ambiguity of the statutory definition of "stationary source," the
lack of judicial expertise in environmental regulation, 17 and
the lack of political accountability in the judicial branch, that
the EPA had developed "a permissible construction of the stat-
of Statutory Interpretation: A Well-Tailored Means for Facilitating Environmental
Regulation, 19 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 493 (1995); Kenneth A. Manaster, Justice
Stevens, Judicial Power, and the Varieties of Environmental Litigation, 74
FORDHAM L. REV. 1963 (2006).
15. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43 (footnotes omitted).
16. Id. at 840.
17. To avoid overstating judicial use of the expertise rationale (at least in the
Supreme Court), it should be noted that Mead "suggest[s] that Chevron rests on
Congress's implicit delegation of law-interpreting authority to agencies." Jacob E.
Gersen, Overlapping and Underlapping Jurisdiction in Administrative Law, 2006
SUP. CT. REV. 201, 217 (2007) (citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218,
230 n.ll (2001).
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ute [that sought] to accommodate progress in reducing air pol-
lution with economic growth." ' 8
EPA regulations permitted a plant-wide definition of the
term stationary source. 19 Under section 111(a)(3) of the CAA,
"stationary source" is defined as "any building, structure, facil-
ity, or installation which emits or may emit any air pollut-
ant. ' 20 Had Congress unambiguously determined whether to
allow this bubble concept? The Court answered in the negative
after considering the statutory language, legislative history,
and underlying policy of the CAA. 2 1
However, the determination of whether a statutory pro-
vision is ambiguous under Chevron step one (and thus leading
to agency deference under step two) is subject to much malle-
ability, for what is (un)ambiguous is often in the eye of the be-
holder. For example, in Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of
Communities for a Great Oregon, a case determining the extent
to which the Department of the Interior could regulate habitat
modification under the Endangered Species Act ("ESA"), both
the majority and dissent firmly construed the statutory provi-
sion at issue but nevertheless reached opposite conclusions
about its meaning. 22 Footnote nine of Chevron further elabo-
rates Chevron step one:
The judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory
construction and must reject administrative constructions
which are contrary to clear congressional intent. If a court,
employing traditional tools of statutory construction, ascer-
tains that Congress had an intention on the precise question
at issue, that intention is the law and must be given ef-
fect. 2 3
Thus, depending on what a judge considers to be legitimate
"traditional tools of statutory interpretation, 24 he or she may
18. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 866.
19. Id. at 840.
20. Id. at 840 n.2.
21. Id. at 859-66.
22. 515 U.S. 687, 708, 730 (1995).
23. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9 (citations omitted); accord Chem. Mfr.'s
Ass'n v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 470 U.S. 116, 152 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing) ("Chevron's deference requirement ... was explicitly limited to cases in which
congressional intent cannot be discerned through the use of the traditional tech-
niques of statutory interpretation.").
24. Chevron. 467 U.S. at 843 n.9.
HeinOnline  -- 79 U. Colo. L. Rev. 773 2008
UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW
reach a different conclusion under Chevron.25 The Babbitt ma-
jority relied not only on the "ordinary understanding" of the
statutory text 26 but also on the ESA's legislative history27 and
on the underlying purpose of the ESA to protect animal species
that are threatened or on the verge of extinction. 28 Alterna-
tively, Justice Scalia's dissent in Babbit focused solely on tex-
tualism and the plain meaning of the relevant statutory provi-
sions. 29
While the courts have debated the legitimacy of certain
tools of statutory interpretation under Chevron step one, the
employment of any particular tool can cut in both directions.
Invocations of legislative history can lead to outcomes that both
permit and prohibit expansive regulation of environmental and
public health, 30 and the same claim can be made regarding in-
vocations of the plain meaning rule and a literal interpretation
of the statutory text. 31
2. Chevron Step Two
If an environmental statutory provision is deemed ambigu-
ous under Chevron step one, a court will defer to the agency's
interpretation of the provisions under Chevron step two so long
as it is a "permissible" or "reasonable" construction of the stat-
ute.32 While Chevron step two and the arbitrary and capri-
25. For a discussion of inconsistency in judicial interpretation of environ-
mental statutes, see Jason J. Czarnezki, Shifting Science, Considered Costs, and
Static Statutes: The Interpretation of Expansive Environmental Legislation, 24 VA.
ENVTL. L. J. 395 (2006) [hereinafter Czarnezki, Shifting Science].
26. Babbitt, 515 U.S. at 697 (stating that an "ordinary understanding" of the
term at issue supports the Secretary of the Interior's conclusion).
27. Id. at 704 (citing S. Rep. No. 93-307, at 7 (1973); H.R. Rep. No. 93-412, at
15 (1973)) (noting language in both the Senate and House Reports that the ESA
was intended to have the broadest possible meaning).
28. Id. at 698 (referring to the "broad purpose of the ESA" and stating that
the ESA is "the most comprehensive legislation for the preservation of endangered
species ever enacted by any nation" (quoting TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 180
(1978))).
29. Id. at 717 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
30. Compare id. (majority opinion), and Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Dono-
van (The Cotton Dust Case), 452 U.S. 490 (1981), with FDA v. Brown & William-
son Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
31. Compare Pub. Citizen v. Young, 831 F.2d 1108 (D.C. Cir. 1987), with In-
dus. Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst. (The Benzene Case), 448 U.S.
607 (1980).
32. See, e.g., United States v. Labonte, 520 U.S. 751, 778 (1997) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) ("Were the Commission a typical administrative agency, we would ask
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cious standard used in the hard look doctrine, as discussed be-
low, are doctrinally distinct, many courts view both as meaning
reasonable on the merits. 33 The D.C. Circuit, however, has at-
tempted to draw a distinction where Chevron step two focuses
on the reasonableness of an agency interpretation of law, while
arbitrary and capricious review focuses on the reasonableness
of an agency's policy choice. 34 Due to the difficulty in defining
step two, courts rarely strike down agency action under step
two, and the Supreme Court has done so arguably only twice. 35
Ohio v. United States Department of the Interior36 is read
in environmental law courses to discuss contingent valuation
and nonuse values for natural resources, and it is read in ad-
ministrative law classes to explain the difference between
Chevron steps one and two. In Ohio, the D.C. Circuit held in-
valid a regulation, promulgated under the Comprehensive En-
vironmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
("CERCLA"), limiting recovery to the lesser of restoration cost
or lost use value of a natural resource. 37 CERCLA requires
damages used "to restore, replace, or acquire the equivalent of
such natural resources. ' 38 But CERCLA states that damages
"shall not be limited ... to restore or replace such resources." 39
Thus, while it is a possible interpretation of law to consider use
values alone under the statutory text, it is not a reasonable in-
terpretation of law. The statute is ambiguous under step one
because Congress did not explicitly state what standard should
whether its 'policy' choice is 'reasonable,' hence 'permissible,' given the statute."
(quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
843-44, 866 (1984))).
33. For a discussion of the conflation between Chevron step two and the hard
look doctrine, see Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsid-
ered, 72 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 1253 (1997). See also infra Part V.B.3.
34. BREYER, STEWART, SUNSTEIN & SPITZER, supra note 13, at 396 (citing Re-
publican Nat'l Comm. v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 76 F.3d 400, 407 (D.C. Cir. 1996);
Cont'l Air Lines, Inc. v. Dep't of Transp., 843 F.2d 1444 (D.C. Cir. 1988)). But see
Levin, supra note 33, at 1254.
35. There are two possible candidates: Whitman v. American Trucking Asso-
ciations, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 485 (2001) (though, in my view, this is a step one
case), and AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board, 525 U.S. 366, 392 (1999); id. at
397-98 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). See also Levin, supra
note 33, at 1261 (stating that as of 1997, the Court had never struck down an in-
terpretation of a statutory provision under step two).
36. 880 F.2d 432 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
37. Id. at 444.
38. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(1) (2000).
39. Id.
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be used to determine damages. 40 But to limit damages to use
value alone may be unreasonable under Chevron step two.4 1
B. Chevron Step Zero and Alternative Forms of Judicial
Deference
"[T]he inquiry that must be made in deciding whether
courts should turn to the Chevron framework at all" can be
called Chevron "step zero. '42 If the Chevron framework does
not apply, then courts may turn to some other lower or modi-
fied form of deference for agency interpretations of statutes (for
example, Skidmore deference43 ). An agency might receive def-
erence because it is interpreting something other than a stat-
ute, such as its own regulations (e.g., Seminole Rock defer-
ence 44), or because deference is appropriate based on the need
for scientific expertise. 45 In United States v. Mead Corp., the
Supreme Court held,
[A]dministrative implementation of a particular statutory
provision qualifies for Chevron deference when it appears
that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to
make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency in-
terpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the ex-
ercise of that authority. Delegation of such authority may
40. See Jason J. Czarnezki & Adrianne K. Zahner, The Utility of Non-Use
Values in Natural Resource Damage Assessments, 32 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV.
509, 518 (2005).
41. Ohio v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 880 F.2d at 462 ("While it is not irra-
tional to look at market price as one factor in determining the use value of a re-
source, it is unreasonable to view market price as the exclusive factor, or even the
predominant one.").
42. Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 GEO.
L.J. 833, 836 (2001).
43. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) ("We consider that the
rulings, interpretations and opinions of the Administrator under this Act, while
not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body
of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly
resort for guidance. The weight of such a judgment in a particular case will de-
pend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reason-
ing, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors
which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.").
44. See Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945).
45. See Ass'n of Irritated Residents v. EPA, 423 F.3d 989, 997 (9th Cir. 2005)
("This is a determination that is scientific in nature and is entitled to the most
deference on review." (citing Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. NRDC, 462 U.S. 87, 103
(1983); Cent. Ariz. Water Cons. Dist. v. EPA, 990 F.2d 1531, 1539-40 (9th Cir.
1993))); see also infra Part V.D.
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be shown in a variety of ways, as by an agency's power to
engage in adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking,
or by some other indication of a comparable congressional
intent.46
This Chevron step zero inquiry, however, has proved to be
both difficult to doctrinally understand and implement in prac-
tice. Professor Lisa Schultz Bressman wrote, "When the Su-
preme Court decided [Mead] . . . Justice Scalia predicted that
judicial review of agency action would devolve into chaos....
Justice Scalia actually understated the effect of Mead.'' 47
In his article, appropriately titled Chevron Step Zero, Pro-
fessor Cass Sunstein attempts to "provide an understanding of
the foundations and nature of the Step Zero dilemma"48 and of-
fers a trilogy of cases 49 to sort out the Chevron framework:
Christensen v. Harris County,50 Mead,51 and Barnhart v.
Walton.52
Christensen held that agency "[i]nterpretations such as
those in opinion letters-like interpretations contained in pol-
icy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines,
all of which lack the force of law-do not warrant Chevron-style
deference" 53 and are "entitled to respect" due to their persua-
sive authority, 54 a lower form of deference than Chevron known
as Skidmore deference. Mead, like Christensen, confirmed that
Skidmore deference survived Chevron,55 and, as quoted above,
clarified the "force of law" test found in Christensen. However,
Barnhart indicates that the Chevron framework may be appli-
cable even if an agency acts through less formal means than
those suggested by Mead.56 "[Tjhe Step Zero trilogy has pro-
46. 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001).
47. Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of
Agency Action, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1443, 1443-44 (2005).
48. Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 191 (2006).
49. See id. at 211-19.
50. 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (giving Skidmore deference for opinion letter
about overtime pay to sheriff department under the FLSA).
51. 533 U.S. 218, 231 (2001) (holding U.S. Customs rule fails to qualify for
Chevron deference, but preserving the possibility of Skidmore deference).
52. 535 U.S. 212, 215 (2002) (upholding agency interpretation of a Social Se-
curity Administration regulation).
53. Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587.
54. Id. (citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)).
55. See Sunstein, supra note 48, at 213-15.
56. Id. at 216-19. Said the Barnhart Court:
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duced a great deal of complexity in lower court rulings"57-the
chaos continues. 58
C. Arbitrary and Capricious Review-The Hard Look
Doctrine
Under section 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act
("APA"), agency decisions will be overturned if they are "arbi-
trary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in ac-
cordance with law."59 The doctrine was originally described in
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe. 60 In Overton
Park, private citizens and environmental groups challenged the
use of federal funds to construct a highway through a public
park in Memphis, Tennessee. 61 "The growing public concern
about the quality of our natural environment has prompted
Congress in recent years to enact legislation designed to curb
the accelerating destruction of our country's natural beauty,"62
and thus plaintiffs challenged the proposed highway location
under a federal statute that prohibited funding of highway con-
struction through public parks if "feasible and prudent" alter-
native routes existed. 63
The Court held that the APA's arbitrary and capricious
standard requires agencies to engage in careful consideration
of relevant factors in the decision-making process, and in this
case the agency provided no explanation for the absence of con-
sideration of alternative routes. 64 The Supreme Court clarified
Overton Park in Kleppe v. Sierra Club, in which it explicitly
held that courts are required to take a "hard look" at the envi-
[T]he interstitial nature of the legal question, the related expertise of the
Agency, the importance of the question to administration of the statute,
the complexity of that administration, and the careful consideration the
Agency has given the question over a long period of time all indicate that
Chevron provides the appropriate legal lens through which to view the
legality of the Agency interpretation here at issue.
535 U.S. at 222.
57. Sunstein, supra note 48, at 219 (citations omitted).
58. See infra Part V.B.
59. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2000).
60. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
61. See id. at 406.
62. Id. at 404.
63. Id. at 405.
64. See id. at 416-17.
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ronmental effects of their proposed action. 65 This hard look
doctrine provides for searching judicial review, requiring agen-
cies to clearly explain what factors they considered in the deci-
sionmaking process and the weight given to those factors. 66
II. JUDICIAL DECISIONMAKING IN ENVIRONMENTAL AND
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
"[E]mpirical legal scholarship on judicial decisionmaking
[has] emerged from obscurity to become the subject of disputa-
tion in a larger societal or academic arena. ' 67 This Part dis-
cusses the empirical scholarship on judicial decisionmaking in
environmental and administrative law, focusing on the role of
the legal and attitudinal models. The legal model refers to tra-
ditional interpretive approaches familiar to lawyers, such as
the language of legal texts, standards of review, and legislative
history. The attitudinal model is legal realism, where judges
"decidef disputes in light of the facts of the case vis-A-vis
[their] ideological attitudes and values. ' 68 The existing schol-
arship informs us that ideology impacts judicial decisionmak-
ing in environmental cases and, furthermore, begins to address
whether political preferences may influence how judges use
Chevron in reviewing agency interpretations of environmental
law. This Article expands on this research.
The current focus of empirical legal studies, including in
the environmental law context, is explaining decisionmaking as
a function of political ideology. Political scientists have long
argued that judicial decisionmaking is a function of policy pref-
erences. Professors Jeffrey Segal and Harold Spaeth stated,
"Rehnquist votes the way he does because he is extremely con-
servative; Marshall voted the way he did because he was ex-
65. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976) (citing NRDC v. Mor-
ton, 458 F.2d 827, 838 (D.C. Cir. 1972)).
66. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,
43 (1983). For more discussion of the hard look doctrine in the environmental law
context, see Jason J. Czarnezki, Revisiting the Tense Relationship Between the
U.S. Supreme Court, Administrative Procedure, and the National Environmental
Policy Act, 25 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3 (2006).
67. Gregory C. Sisk & Michael Heise, Judges and Ideology: Public and Aca-
demic Debates About Statistical Measures, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 743, 745 (2005); see
also Michael Heise, The Importance of Being Empirical, 26 PEPP. L. REV. 807
(1999).
68. SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 10, at 86.
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tremely liberal. ' 69 Legal scholarship has confirmed at least
some role for the attitudinal model in the environmental law
field, 70 though only recently have scholars begun to empirically
consider the role legal procedures and doctrine play in case
outcomes, whether in environmental law71 or other areas of
law. 72
Now ten years old, Professor Richard Revesz' influential
empirical study of judicial decisionmaking in cases involving
the EPA before the D.C. Circuit concluded, consistent with
later findings, 73 that judges' perceived opinions about envi-
ronmental policy determined their votes. 74 Considering 250
challenges to EPA decisions before the D.C. Circuit between
1970 and 1994, 75 Revesz found that in industry challenges to
EPA decisions, Republican court appointees had higher rever-
sal rates than did Democratic appointees. 76 For challenges of
EPA decisions brought by environmental groups, Democratic
appointees had higher reversal rates than Republican appoint-
ees.
77
69. Id.
70. See SUNSTEIN, SCHKADE, ELLMAN & SAWICKI, supra note 10; Revesz, su-
pra note 1; Sunstein, Schkade & Ellman, supra note 1.
71. See Miles & Sunstein, supra note 2.
72. See Czarnezki & Ford, supra note 10, at 843 n.5 (citing DANIEL R.
PINELLO, GAY RIGHTS AND AMERICAN LAW 131-43 (2003); HAROLD J. SPAETH &
JEFFREY A. SEGAL, MAJORITY RULE OR MINORITY WILL: ADHERENCE TO
PRECEDENT ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT (1999); Sara C. Benesh & Jason J.
Czarnezki, The Ideology of Legal Interpretation, 29 WASH. U. J.L. & POLY _
(forthcoming 2009); Robert M. Howard & Jeffrey A. Segal, An Original Look at
Originalism, 36 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 113 (2002); William M. Landes & Richard A.
Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 19 J.L. & ECON.
249 (1976)); see also Stefanie A. Lindquist & Frank B. Cross, Empirically Testing
Dworkin's Chain Novel Theory: Studying the Path of Precedent, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1156 (2005); Stefanie A. Lindquist & David E. Klein, The Influence of Jurispru-
dential Considerations on Supreme Court Decisionmaking: A Study of Conflict
Cases, 40 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 135 (2006); Sara C. Benesh & Harold J. Spaeth, What
Explains Dissensus? A Test of the Legal and Attitudinal Models (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the authors).
73. See, e.g., JAY E. AUSTIN ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE, JUDGING
NEPA: A "HARD LOOK" AT JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING UNDER THE NATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT, available at http://www.elistore.org/reportsdetail.
asp?ID=11071 (last visited Jan. 19, 2007) (finding that NEPA claims are 30 per-
centage points more successful in front of Democratically appointed judges).
74. See Revesz, supra note 1, at 1739. For a response to the Revesz study, see
Harry T. Edwards, Collegiality and Decision Making on the D.C. Circuit, 84 VA. L.
REV. 1335 (1998).
75. See Revesz, supra note 1, at 1721.
76. Id. at 1738.
77. Id.
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Nearly a decade after the Revesz article, Sunstein,
Schkade, and Ellman (and now Sawicki) further analyzed judi-
cial decisionmaking in environmental cases before the D.C.
Circuit. Building upon the Revesz dataset in their book Are
Judges Political?: An Empirical Analysis of the Federal Judici-
ary78 and in their earlier Virginia Law Review article, 79 the
authors found that judges more often than not voted in stereo-
typically ideological directions 8° and that Democratic appoint-
ees were far more likely to vote against challenges to EPA than
Republicans. 8 1
Scholars recently have begun to empirically evaluate how
methods of legal interpretation and legal frameworks impact
judging in the environmental law context. More specifically,
significant research has focused on how administrative law
standards of deference impact case outcomes,8 2 including envi-
ronmental cases.
Professors Miles and Sunstein analyzed 183 federal appel-
late cases from all circuits where panels reviewed interpreta-
78. SUNSTEIN, SCHKADE, ELLMAN & SAWICKI, supra note 10, at 34, 161-62
n.20 ("We assembled the sample of EPA cases by shepardizing Chevron U.S.A.
Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), and searching for chal-
lenges to EPA decisions.... The sample includes 181 cases from June 25, 1984,
through August 1, 2005.").
79. Again, they explored a larger version of what was initially explored by
Revesz's analysis of challenges to EPA regulations in the D.C. Circuit. See Sun-
stein, Schkade & Ellman, supra note 1, at 322; see also id. at 313 n.33 ("We as-
sembled the sample of EPA cases by searching http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/
federal/judicial/cadc.cfm for cases with 'EPA' or the EPA administrator's name in
the case title. We crosschecked this set of cases with results from a Lexis search of
'EPA' and 'Environmental Protection Agency.' If a judge voted to afford the indus-
try challenger any relief, then the vote was coded as a pro-industry vote. The
sample includes cases from 09/19/94-12/31/02. For cases before 1994, we relied on
Revesz .... We identified a total of 142 cases.")
80. SUNSTEIN, SCHKADE, ELLMAN & SAWICKI, supra note 10, at 34 (finding
that Democratic appointees voted in a stereotypically liberal direction 61% of the
time, in comparison to Republican appointees who voted stereotypically 51% of
the time).
81. Sunstein, Schkade & Ellman, supra note 1, at 322-23 (showing that De-
mocratic appointees voted against agency challenges 64% of the time, compared to
Republican appointees voting against agency challenges 46% of the time).
82. See generally Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship
and Obedience to Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals,
107 YALE L.J. 2155 (1998); Orin S. Kerr, Shedding Light on Chevron: An Empiri-
cal Study of the Chevron Doctrine in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 15 YALE J. ON
REG. 1 (1998); Richard L. Revesz, Congressional Influence on Judicial Behavior?
An Empirical Examination of Challenges to Agency Action in the D.C. Circuit, 76
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1100 (2001).
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tions of law by the EPA. 83 They found the overall validation
rate (i.e., deference rate to the EPA under Chevron) was
61.7%.84 The rates broken down between Republican and De-
mocratic appointees differed only slightly-62.5% for Republi-
can appointees and 60.7% for Democratic appointees.8 5
Consistent with the findings in Sunstein's earlier co-
authored works, 86 these rates showed a wider disparity along
ideological lines when taking into account panel compositions
(i.e., panel effects). 87 "Collegial concurrences" were common,
where Republican appointees displayed "relatively liberal vot-
ing patterns when sitting with two Democratic appointees,"
and vice versa. 88 This held true for Democratic appointees sit-
ting on EPA cases, but not for Republicans sitting on EPA
cases. 89 "Republican appointees show the same rate of liberal
voting regardless of whether they are sitting with one or two
Democratic appointees." 90
These findings built upon the existing empirical literature
about how courts, using Chevron, review agency interpreta-
tions of statutes. 91 Based on existing research, at least some
generalizations can be made. First, Chevron has increased the
likelihood of affirmance of agency interpretations of law, with
83. Miles & Sunstein, supra note 2, at 825.
84. Id. at 853.
85. Id. at 852, Figure 1.
86. SUNSTEIN, SCHKADE, ELLMAN & SAWICKI, supra note 10, at 34 (consider-
ing panel effects and finding that both Republican and Democratic appointees
showed "ideological amplification and ideological dampening"). But see id. at 62-
63 (finding that in the D.C. Circuit environmental regulation challenges, Democ-
ratics appointees, unlike Republican judges, are impacted solely by party and not
panel effects).
87. Miles & Sunstein, supra note 2, at 852 (finding that Democratic and Re-
publican appointees showed far more political voting patterns when they were sit-
ting on panels when all the judges were either Democratic or Republican ap-
pointed).
88. Id. at 863.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. See, e.g., Linda R. Cohen & Matthew L. Spitzer, Solving the Chevron Puz-
zle, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 65 (1994); Kerr, supra note 82; Peter H. Schuck
& E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of Federal Ad-
ministrative Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 984; see also Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Def-
erence to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969 (1992); Herbert M. Kritzer et al.,
Deciding the Supreme Court's Administrative Law Cases: Does Chevron Matter?
(August 2002), http://www.polisci.wisc.edu/-kritzer/research/supcourt/apsa2002.
pdf (last visited May 26, 2007).
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deference rates above 60% or higher.92 (The data in this study
show the rate at 69.2%.) Second, while both Democratic and
Republican judges are likely to uphold agency interpretations,
judges are more likely to support interpretations consistent
with their perceived policy preferences. 93 And finally, voting
outcomes are influenced by panel effects (i.e., homogenous ideo-
logical panels are more likely to reverse agency action inconsis-
tent with their ideological views, 94 including in the environ-
mental law context). 95
92. Kerr, supra note 82, at 30 (examining applications of the Chevron doctrine
in published federal circuit court cases for the years 1995 and 1996, which con-
sisted of 253 applications in 223 published cases, and finding that agency inter-
pretations were accepted in 73% of the applications); Miles & Sunstein, supra note
2, at 849 (finding that the overall average validation rate of the circuit judges in
Chevron cases, at about 64%, is roughly similar to that of the Supreme Court jus-
tices, which averaged 67%); Schuck & Elliott, supra note 91, at 1057 (stating that
the most important finding in the study was that circuit courts were affirming
agency decisions at a steadily increasing rate from 76% in 1984-85, and over 81%
in 1985 after Chevron); see also Humphries & Songer, supra note 3, at 215 (find-
ing across all cases, agencies had a success rate of 58.0%). But see Kritzer et al.,
supra note 91, at 15, 22 (finding no evidence of increased deference on the Su-
preme Court).
93. Cross & Tiller, supra note 82, at 2169 (finding "fairly profound" partisan
effects as panels consisting of a Republican majority rendered conservative deci-
sions 54% of the time, and panels of a majority of Democrats rendered liberal de-
cisions 68% of the time); Humphries & Songer, supra note 3, at 216 ("Panels of
liberal judges are much more likely to uphold liberal than conservative agency de-
cisions and conservative judges favor conservative decisions."); Kerr, supra note
82, at 36, 39 (finding that judges of both parties upheld Democratic interpreta-
tions at 71% rates and Republican interpretations at similar rates of 78% and
73%, with statistically insignificant differences between the rates, and that was a
tendency for Republican and Democratic judges to reach results consistent with
their assumed political ideologies); see also Kritzer et al., supra note 91, at 17.
94. LEE EPSTEIN & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, ADVICE AND CONSENT: THE POLITICS
OF JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS 117 (2005) (In implementing Chevron, "Republican
circuit court judges sitting on panels with two other Republicans frequently voted
to reverse liberal agency decisions but were less likely to vote to overturn them if
a single Democrat served on the panel. Similarly, Democratic judges on panels
with other Democrats frequently voted against conservative agency decisions but
were less likely to reverse them if a Republican sat along with them."); Cross &
Tiller, supra note 82, at 2171-72 (finding that case outcomes were impacted dra-
matically by panel composition).
95. EPSTEIN & SEGAL, supra note 94, at 129 (using data in environmental
cases from Sunstein, Schkade & Ellman, supra note 1) ("When Republicans sit
with all other Republicans, they support industry challenges to environmental
regulations in about seven out of every ten cases. That figure, however, declines
to five out of ten if even one Democratic whistleblower is on the panel. And
should a judge find herself the lone Republican, odds are that she will rule against
industry: in only four out of every ten cases do Republicans support challenges to
environment[al] regulations when they sit with two Democrats.").
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III. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH DESIGN
A. Data and Coding Methodology
This Article analyzes environmental law cases decided in
the U.S. Courts of Appeals over a three-year period to investi-
gate what factors-including ideological, legal, and institu-
tional variables-impact judicial review of administrative
agency interpretations of environmental statutes. A search of
environmental cases from 2003 to 2005 that cite to Chevron
created an over-inclusive dataset of ninety-three cases. 96
Deleted from this list were cases decided en banc, 97 opin-
ions amended later that year, 98 and cases not involving an en-
vironmental statute or statutory interpretation. What remains
are cases, some dealing with multiple issues of statutory inter-
pretation, 99 that were decided by three-judge federal appellate
panels 0 0 that reviewed agency interpretations of environ-
mental statutes. Judicial votes, however, are the unit of analy-
sis. Thus, the final dataset consists of 347 total judicial votes
covering 116 instances of statutory interpretation in 70 envi-
ronmental law cases.
96. The actual search, in Westlaw's FENV-CTA (Federal Environmental Law
Cases - Court of Appeals) Database, was as follows: DA(AFT 12/31/2002 & BEF
1/1/2006) & ("467 U.S. 837" OR "104 S.CT. 2778").
97. United States v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 432 F.3d 161 (3d Cir.
2005); Wilderness Soc'y v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 353 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir.
2003).
98. Vigil v. Leavitt, 366 F.3d 1025 (9th Cir. 2004); High Sierra Hikers Ass'n v.
Blackwell, 381 F.3d 886 (9th Cir. 2004); BCCA Appeal Group v. EPA., 348 F.3d 93
(5th Cir. 2003); Envtl. Def. Ctr., Inc. v. EPA., 319 F.3d 398 (9th Cir. 2003); Davis
v. EPA, 336 F.3d 965 (9th Cir. 2003).
99. Each separate issue of statutory interpretation was coded separately. An
issue was defined as the interpretation of a single statutory provision that ap-
plied, in any fashion, the Chevron doctrine. Thus, while one statutory provision
could be struck down under Chevron step one, step two, or the APA, and all three
legal mechanisms discussed, this would count as one issue. See, e.g., New York. v.
EPA, 413 F.3d 3, 21-31 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (Part III). Yet, a single case can also con-
tain multiple issues of statutory interpretation. See, e.g., id. at 36-42 (Parts V,
VI, VII). Issues were ignored if they did not deal with statutory interpretation or
issues of deference to agencies based on their interpretation of an environmental
or natural resources statute.
100. The sole exception is the case of Natural Resources Def. Council v. Abra-
ham, which was decided by only a two-judge panel. 355 F.3d 179, 183 n.1 (2d Cir.
2004) ("Judge Calabresi, originally a member of the panel, recused himself subse-
quent to oral argument. The appeal is being disposed of by the remaining mem-
bers of the panel, who are in agreement." (citing 2d Cir. R. 0.14)).
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Analyzing these votes and cases, this Article builds on ex-
isting research to further consider the role of legal, as well as
ideological, factors in judicial decisionmaking in environmental
law. It also seeks more descriptive information about environ-
mental jurisprudence outside the D.C. Circuit and the EPA. To
expand upon and supplement earlier empirical inquiries into
statutory interpretation in environmental law, this Article also
considers the other courts of appeals and other administrative
agencies such as the U.S. Forest Service, Army Corps of Engi-
neers, and the Department of the Interior.
To operationalize judges' ideological or policy preferences
(and attempt to improve upon the Democrat versus Republican
dichotomy 1 ), the best available option is to rely primarily on
Giles, Hettinger, and Pepper's ("GHP") adaptation 0 2 of Keith
Poole's "common space scores," 10 3 which are measures of ideol-
ogy of members of the House and Senate. 104 This measure is
more refined than using the political party of the appointing
president. For each appellate judge, GHP assign him or her
one of two common space scores. For judges nominated to sit in
a state represented by a senator (or senators) of the president's
party, the senator's common space score is used (or an average
if both senators are of the president's party), reflecting the tra-
dition of senatorial courtesy. 105 If neither senator in office at
the time of appointment is of the same party as the appointing
president, then GHP assign the judge the appointing presi-
101. See Jonathan R. Nash, Book Review, 4 PERSP. ON POL. 397, 397 (2006) (re-
viewing NANCY SCHERER, SCORING POINTS: POLITICIANS, ACTIVISTS, AND THE
LOWER FEDERAL COURTS APPOINTMENT PROCESS (2005)).
102. See Micheal W. Giles, Virginia A. Hettinger & Todd Peppers, Picking Fed-
eral Judges: A Note on Policy and Partisan Selection Agendas, 54 POL. RES.
QUARTERLY 623 (2001). The GHP scores have been validated as a measure of ide-
ology. Virginia A. Hettinger, Stefanie A. Lindquist & Wendy L. Martinek, Com-
paring Attitudinal and Strategic Accounts of Dissenting Behavior on the U.S.
Courts of Appeals, 48 AM. J. POL. SCI. 123, 123-37 (2004). The GHP scores used
were from the 2000 update. For judges appointed after 2000, Poole's senatorial
and presidential GHP scores updated thru the 108th Congress of 2004 were used.
Judges appointed in 2005 were assigned the President's GHP score.
103. See generally Keith T. Poole, Recovering a Basic Space from a Set of Issue
Scales, 42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 954 (1998). Poole's common space scores are available
online at www.voteview.com.
104. See id. at 982.
105. Senatorial courtesy is the custom whereby the President and Senate Judi-
ciary Committee consult home state senators on a judicial nomination. Histori-
cally, the Senate has been reluctant to confirm a presidential judicial appointment
if the nominee's home state senators do not approve of the nomination.
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dent's score. 106 Scores for both senators and presidents are on
the same scale as those used for judges, ranging from most lib-
eral at -1.0 to most conservative at +1.0. The GHP score of
each participating judge as well as the average GHP score of
each panel were calculated. 107
In addition to considering ideology, through intensive con-
tent analysis, the cases were coded for descriptive information,
variables concerning the use of the Chevron doctrine, and legal
interpretive tools. The cases were coded for a variety of basic
descriptive items: year of decision; circuit; agency at issue; en-
vironmental statute at issue; names of participating judges;
whether the judge signed a majority, concurring (all types) or
dissenting opinion; and whether the judge penned the majority
opinion.
Cases also were coded for the following items: ideological
direction of the lower court decision;10 8 whether it was a pre-
enforcement challenge or an enforcement challenge; 109 whether
the issue was decided under Chevron step one (where a judge
determined that the statute was unambiguous or clear, or that
Congress had in fact spoken to the precise question at issue) or
decided under Chevron step two (where an agency received
Chevron deference under step two, or the judge determined the
agency interpretation was a reasonable or permissible con-
struction of the statute following a determination that the
statutory provision at issue was ambiguous); 110 whether the
106. Giles, Hettinger & Peppers, supra note 102, at 631.
107. Accord Humphries & Songer, supra note 3, at 212 (measuring panel ideol-
ogy by computing the mean judge ideology of all the judges who participated in
the panel decision).
108. The operational definition of directional vote was as follows: A conserva-
tive vote is a vote against an environmental group or a vote for industry over
agency. A liberal vote is a pro-environment vote for an agency versus industry, or
a vote for an environmental group. In some cases there was no lower court deci-
sion due to direct appeal, or the lower court decision had more than one outcome
in more than one ideological direction.
109. An enforcement challenge is, for example, a challenge to an agency action
seeking to sanction a broken rule, permit, or law, a challenge to an EPA decision
that attainment was reached, or a challenge to a permitting decision. Pre-
enforcement challenges are, for example, facial challenges to rule, permit, plan, or
petition as inconsistent with the statutory language.
110. Where a court exhibited conflation of Chevron steps one and two, the case
was coded as having been solely decided under step one, unless the court explicitly
invoked "step two," resulting in the cases being coded as considering both steps.
Where a court addressed step two only in arguendo, both steps were included in
the dataset, unless the agency action was reversed in which case the decision was
coded as being decided solely under step one. To know how to best code these
786 [Vol. 79
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agency decision violated the arbitrary and capricious standard
of the APA; whether the agency action was upheld under an-
other type of deference framework and (if so) under what type;
and whether the opinion signed by the judge invoked the use of
legislative history. "'
Finally, the cases were coded for the judicial directional
vote (where a conservative vote is a vote against an environ-
mental group or a vote for industry over an agency, and a lib-
eral vote is a pro-environment vote for an agency versus indus-
try or a vote for an environmental group), and whether the
judge voted to reverse or affirm the government agency's deci-
sion. Each of the judge-specific variables and the outcome vari-
ables were coded for each judge. If one judge joined the opinion
of another, without writing separately, all data would be iden-
tical save for his or her name and GHP score.
It is necessary to elaborate on the coding of the chosen
standards for review of agency action, the implementation of
those standards, and the legal tools employed by the judge. As
described doctrinally in Part I above, courts may employ the
Chevron framework, some lesser form of deference (e.g.,
Skidmore) as permitted by Mead, or the APA's arbitrariness
standard, as well as alternative forms of deference. As also
noted, courts can uphold or strike down agency action under
Chevron step one or two. While courts likely will not strike
down agency decisions as unreasonable under step two, step
one allows for greater flexibility, depending on the interpretive
tools employed, to strike down or uphold the agency action.
Breaking down each judicial vote, in each issue, into each
Chevron step, permits a more refined measure than simply de-
termining whether the court deferred to the agency under ei-
ther step as was done in the studies discussed in Part II, and
allows for measurement and analysis of whether the doctrine
"mixed" cases as step one or two, it would be helpful to learn, post-National Cable
& Telecommunications Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Services, 545 U.S. 967 (2005),
what words in prior decisions might suffice to permit agency reinterpretation. In
other words, are these step one cases or step two cases for Brand X purposes?
11. I also sought to code the cases for invocations of the plain meaning rule
and underlying purpose of the statute. However, like my previous work, I had
reservations about coding for the plain meaning rule. Czarnezki & Ford, supra
note 10, at 865. I also found that coding for the underlying purpose of the statute
is not particularly informative from a quantitative standpoint as many opinions,
early in the decision, point out the general purpose of the statute, not making it
clear how or why it is relevant to the legal analysis. See infra Part V.C.
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works as expected and analysis of the possible strategic use of
the Chevron steps in environmental jurisprudence.
Due to the malleable nature of Chevron step one as to what
interpretive tools are used, cases also were coded for the invo-
cation of legislative history. To count as a use, "a judge must
have used the interpretive tool in support of his or her legal
analysis"11 2 in interpreting the environmental statute at issue,
so long as "the reference was not clearly dicta and the reference
was not a rejection of the interpretive tool's value generally." 113
B. Research Questions and Hypotheses
By coding the above cases and corresponding judicial votes,
we can learn valuable descriptive and analytical information
about how, what, and where cases dealing with agency inter-
pretations of environmental statutes are reviewed in the fed-
eral appellate courts. These findings have both doctrinal and
pedagogical value. Legal scholars are beginning to research
and students frequently ask whether the appellate courts con-
sistently review agency actions and how the legal framework
chosen actually impacts case outcomes. This type of research
also answers a more foundational question-what are the real-
world consequences of existing and available legal doctrine in
environmental law (or administrative law in the environmental
law context)?
This Article attempts to address a number of questions
concerning judicial review of agency interpretations of envi-
ronmental law. What is the distribution of decisions involving
judicial review of agency interpretations of environmental law
among the circuits? Are most of these decisions made in the
D.C. Circuit? 114  Are these pre-enforcement or post-
enforcement challenges to agency actions? What number of ju-
dicial votes in each of the circuits reach liberal or conservative
outcomes, and affirm or reverse the agency action? What agen-
112. Czarnezki & Ford, supra note 10, at 864.
113. Id. at 864 n.102.
114. Does the D.C. Circuit really hear the majority of environmental cases or
only a plurality? See Sunstein, Schkade & Ellman, supra note 1, at 322 ("[W]e
limit our investigation to the D.C. Circuit, which hears the vast majority of envi-
ronmental cases."). Often federal law, like the Clean Air Act, requires certain
claims to be brought before the D.C. Circuit. See, e.g., Clean Air Act § 307(b), 42
U.S.C. § 7607(b) (2000).
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cies were involved, and did their involvement influence judicial
votes for affirmance or reversal of their decisions?
In addition to this information about the relationship be-
tween circuit, agency, statute at issue, and outcome variables,
this Article addresses whether agency actions are being re-
viewed consistently by the appellate courts and whether the le-
gal framework chosen impacts the case outcome. For example,
does the Chevron doctrine work as expected? One would expect
that invocations of step two should usually lead to agency af-
firmance, while agency deference is less predictable under step
one. In addition, what judicial review frameworks (e.g., Chev-
ron steps one and two) are associated with liberal or conserva-
tive judicial votes, or affirming or reversing the agency action?
Finally, in environmental cases, is the Chevron doctrine used
strategically by judges, due to its potential malleability (e.g.,
gaming the use of step one), to achieve their perceived envi-
ronmental policy preferences? And might invocations of cer-
tain interpretive tools under Chevron step one lead to pro- or
anti-environmental outcomes (i.e., a correlation between judi-
cial invocation of legislative history and a pro-environment
vote)?
A number of hypotheses can be tested. First, consistent
with earlier findings supporting the correlation between ideol-
ogy and directional vote, one would hypothesize that as GHP
increases so does the likelihood of a conservative vote. Second,
consistent with findings that conservatives are less likely to
support the action of environmental agencies, one would expect
that as GHP increases the likelihood of an agency affirmance
would decrease.
Third, in asking whether the Chevron doctrine is used
strategically, the hypothesized strategic action would be as fol-
lows: When invoked, Chevron step one is used strategically by
both conservative and liberal judges to reverse agency actions
and achieve their desired directional vote.
Fourth, invocations of legislative history will lead to liberal
outcomes due to the pro-environmental concerns surrounding
the passage of any environmental statute. Fifth, as found in
earlier studies, the ideological composition of the panel should
impact directional vote.
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IV. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN THE COURTS OF APPEALS:
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS AND OBSERVATIONS
This Part describes analyses designed to address the ques-
tions and test the hypotheses found in Part III. Of the 347 ju-
dicial votes in the dataset, 86.2% were in response to pre-
enforcement challenges. Liberal votes were cast 45.5% of the
time, and agency decisions were affirmed at a rate of 69.2%.
These findings and what follows describe the environmental
law statutory interpretation docket in the federal courts of ap-
peals from 2003 to 2005, providing information on how the
docket is divided across the circuits, what is the nature of the
docket, and which environmental statutes are at issue in the
courts. This Part also analyzes how the courts of appeals de-
cide environmental cases where agencies have interpreted the
underlying federal statute, considering the role of ideology and
the strategic use of the Chevron doctrine.
A. Descriptive Information
The data show that cases involving environmental statute
interpretation tend to occur in the D.C. Circuit, involve the
EPA as a party, and focus on the Clean Air and Clean Water
Acts. As seen in Figure 1, more judicial votes in the dataset
took place in the D.C. Circuit than in any other circuit. 115
However, only a plurality of votes was made in the D.C. Cir-
cuit-31.1% of the Chevron-environmental judicial votes were
cast in the circuit-a finding consistent with other empirical
research. 116
The D.C. Circuit's lack of majority is due to the large per-
centage of judicial votes (-19%) found in both the Ninth and
Second Circuits. The Ninth's Circuit's size may explain its
many votes. The Ninth Circuit is the largest of the courts of
appeals with 28 active judgeships covering thirteen districts in
nine states plus two territorial courts. Of the most active cir-
cuits in deciding environmental law cases, only the judges of
the Ninth were more likely to vote in a liberal direction
115. Perhaps this should be of no surprise since many Clean Air Act suits must
be filed in the D.C. Circuit. See supra note 114.
116. Kerr, supra note 82, at 30 ("Fully 30% percent of the applications of the
Chevron doctrine originated in the D.C. Circuit.").
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(53.03% of the time), while D.C. Circuit judges cast conserva-
tive votes 51.85% of the time.
Figure 1
Judicial Votes per Circuit 2003-2005 (N=347)
D.C. 9th 2nd 1st 5th 6th 4th 7th 11th 10th Fed. 8th
More difficult to explain, the Second Circuit accounts for
18.7% of the votes in the dataset. One possible explanation 17
is that the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of
New York litigates environmental cases in a manner different
than would the U.S. Department of Justice. While in other cir-
cuits the Department of Justice itself litigates environmental
disputes, 18 the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District
of New York represents the United States and its agencies in
such civil and criminal litigation before the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of New York. and is re-
117. Further research could investigate forum shopping, which is another pos-
sible explanation.
118. See, e.g., Neal Devins & Michael Herz, The Uneasy Case for Department of
Justice Control of Federal Litigation, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 558, 562 (2003). The
authors point out that in civil cases, DOJ lawyers are the lead litigators with EPA
agency lawyers as part of the team, but in criminal cases agency lawyers are often
the "odd man out."
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sponsible for cases from inception through trial and appeal to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. 119
Figure 2
Agencies at Issue 2003-2005 (N=347)
C)
Lo -
CN
C
a -Cq
Q) 
0-
Dept. of Ag. EPA No agency Others(1 1) USFS
While most research on these Chevron-environmental law
cases focuses on the D.C. Circuit, all of the research focuses on
the EPA. Thus, the data suggest that it may be appropriate to
focus a study of agency interpretation of environmental law
solely on the EPA. As Figure 2 shows, nearly 70% (n = 240) of
the judicial votes counted in this study involved cases where
the EPA was a primary litigant. In addition, the action of the
EPA was affirmed by the courts of appeals 72.9% of the time
(175 affirmances of 240 judicial votes).
The data show that environmental issues in this dataset
are decided in a number of circuits and dominated by EPA liti-
gation. Interestingly, while the dataset includes judicial votes
regarding nearly thirty environmental statutes, the cases are
dominated by two major federal environmental statutes-the
Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act.
119. The United States Department of Justice, Southern District of New York,
Organization and Operation, http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/nys/divisions.html (last
visited Jan. 23, 2006).
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Figure 3
Statutes at Issue 2003-2005 (N=347)
0
CAA CWA Others(24)
As Figure 3 indicates, 64% (222 of 347) of the judicial votes
focus on the Clean Water Act and Clean Air Act. The Clean Air
Act docket is dominated by, generally speaking, attainment is-
sues including compliance concerns, state implementation
plans, and setting of emissions standards, while Clean Water
Act cases are nearly always devoted to permitting.
B. The Role of Ideology
The data show that judges tend to vote in their perceived
ideological direction. Using judicial GHP scores as discussed
above, all judges were divided into three categories of ideologi-
cal distance along the GHP scale of -1 (most liberal) to 1 (most
conservative). Similarly, the average GHP scores of all judges
on each panel were divided into two categories. Tables 1A and
1B provide two-way comparisons of how judicial votes in these
categories were divided in terms of the directional vote.
Confirming earlier findings that judges vote in their per-
ceived ideological direction, the data show that ideology corre-
lates with directional vote in the predicted direction-the
higher the GHP score (i.e., closer to 1), the higher the rate of
conservative voting.
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Table 1A: Relationship Between Judicial GHP Score
Category and Directional Vote
Directional Vote
Scale Conservative Liberal Total
-i to
-0.33 65 72 137
-0.33
47.45% 52.55% 100.00%
-0.33
to03 46 42 880.33
52.27% 47.73% 100.00%
0.33 78 44 122
to 1
63.93% 36.07% 100.00%
Total 189 158 347
54.47% 45.53% 100.00%
Fisher's exact = 0.026**
Note: The GHP scale runs from -1 (most liberal) to 1 (most conserva-
tive).
Table IB: Relationship Between Panel GHP Score
Category and Directional Vote
Directional Vote
Scale Conservative Liberal Total
-1 to 0 95 108 203
46.80% 53.20% 100.00%
0 to 1 94 50 144
65.28% 34.72% 100.00%
Total 189 158 347
54.47% 45.53% 100.00%
Fisher's exact = 0.001"**
Note: The GHP scale runs from -1 (most liberal) to 1 (most conserva-
tive).
As seen in Table 1A, as individual judges fall into higher
GHP categories, the rate of conservative votes increase from
47.45% to 52.27% to 63.93%. Similarly, judicial votes on liberal
panels, with an average GHP score below zero, are liberal
[Vol. 79794
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53.20% of the time. Votes on conservative panels, however, are
liberal only 34.72% of the time. The data suggest that liberals
do not vote as liberal as they would like compared with their
conservative colleagues who are more effective in voting con-
servatively. This is likely a product of the years included for
this study, 2003-05, when most of the regulations or enforce-
ments at issue were products, in some fashion, of the Bush
Administration. Because agency deference is functionally the
default rule, one would expect more conservative votes, making
conservatives (65.28%) more successful in pursuing their ideo-
logical agenda compared with liberals (53.20%). Liberal pref-
erences, during a conservative executive branch, are mitigated
by strong principals of deference in administrative law doc-
trine.
C. Does Chevron Work as Expected?
Chevron works as expected (at least during the years of
this study). As seen in Table 2A, most environmental statutory
provisions (68.86%) are found to be ambiguous.120 Not surpris-
ingly, declarations that the statutory provisions at issue were
ambiguous typically led to affirmances (usually under step two,
but sometimes under another form of deference).
In addition, and possibly to the dismay of textualists, 12 1
when judges invoked the Chevron doctrine generally (i.e., using
120. Admittedly, it may be problematic that over two-thirds of federal legisla-
tion is determined to be unclear. One must question whether judges are abdicat-
ing their Marburyian responsibility to say what the law is, or whether Congress
does a poor job of drafting legislation.
121. See Bradford C. Mank, Is a Textualist Approach to Statutory Interpreta-
tion Pro-Environmentalist?: Why Pragmatic Agency Decisionmaking Is Better than
Judicial Literalism, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1231, 1233-34 (1996) ("Even if tex-
tualist statutory interpretation resulted in more victories for environmental advo-
cacy groups, the tendency of textualists to place so little value on the interpreta-
tions of the environmental agencies that have greater practical experience with
the underlying issues raises serious questions about whether textualism is the
best way to decide environmental policies."); Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to
Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 521 ("In my experi-
ence, there is a fairly close correlation between the degree to which a person is (for
want of a better word) a 'strict constructionist' of statutes, and the degree to
which that person favors Chevron and is willing to give it broad scope. The reason
is obvious. One who finds more often (as I do) that the meaning of a statute is ap-
parent from its text and from its relationship with other laws, thereby finds less
often that the triggering requirement for Chevron deference exists. It is thus rela-
tively rare that Chevron will require me to accept an interpretation which, though
reasonable, I would not personally adopt.").
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either step), they likely affirmed agency action (69.55%). Yet,
Table 2A provides an indication that Chevron results in strate-
gic elements whereby judges have available a host of options
for achieving their desired outcome. On the one hand, perhaps
Table 2A: Relationship Between Chevron Step One
and Reverse/Affirm Agency Action
Vote
Step One Reverse Affirm Total
Ambiguous 29 170 199
14.57% 85.43% 100.00%
32.95% 84.58% 68.86%
Unambiguous 59 31 90
65.56% 34.44% 100.00%
67.05% 15.42% 31.14%
Total 88 201 289
30.45% 69.55% 100.00%
100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Fisher's exact =0.000**
Note: Includes only those judicial votes where opinion invoked Chev-
ron step one.
judges only invoke Chevron step one to declare a statute un-
ambiguous when they want to reverse an agency interpreta-
tion. Hence, when judges found a statutory provision unambi-
guous, they reversed agency action at a rate of 65.56%. On the
other hand, perhaps even when a statute is clear in favor of an
agency's interpretation, it is simply easier to declare the stat-
ute ambiguous and invoke deference under step two. Or, going
further, perhaps clear statutes in favor of an environmental
agency are not litigated, or judges, for pragmatic reasons, are
reluctant to say that a statute has a clear fixed meaning, even
in favor of an agency, because it may have foreclosed and now
will foreclose future agency interpretations pursuant to the
Supreme Court's decision in National Cable & Telecommunica-
tions Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Services. 122
122. Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967,
982 (2005) ("A court's prior judicial construction of a statute trumps an agency
construction otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only if the prior court deci-
sion holds that its construction follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute
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Table 2B: Relationship Between Chevron Step Two
and Reverse/Affirm Agency Action
Vote
Step Two Reverse Affirm Total
No No24 3 27
Deference
88.89% 11.11% 100.00%
82.76% 1.73% 13.37%
Deference 5 170 175
2.86% 97.14% 100.00%
17.24% 98.27% 86.63%
Total 29 173 202
14.36% 85.64% 100.00%
100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Fisher's exact = 0.000"**
Note: Includes only those judicial votes where opinion invoked Chev-
ron step two.
Table 2B indicates that Chevron step two also works as an-
ticipated. In the few cases where a court found an agency was
not entitled deference under step two (13.37%), nearly all
agency action was reversed (88.89%). In fact, where step two
was invoked (i.e., no deference under step two), affirmance oc-
curred in only one case, a unanimous, yet opaque, decision
(three judicial votes) of the Fifth Circuit, which, after engaging
the threshold ambiguity query of step one and discussing step
two, affirmed agency action under the Skidmore grounds of
persuasive deference. 123
As one would anticipate, most judges affirmed agency in-
terpretations when invoking step two (85.64%). However, in
some situations, despite the fact that the interpretation was a
permissible construction of statute, judges nevertheless did not
defer to the agency on other grounds (e.g., the agency did not
follow its own interpretation 124). In other cases, not included
and thus leaves no room for agency discretion."); see also E. Donald Elliott, Chev-
ron Matters: How the Chevron Doctrine Redefined the Roles of Congress, Courts
and Agencies in Environmental Law, 16 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 11-12 (2005) (recog-
nizing that post-Chevron agencies were given more "policy space" to work within).
123. La. Envtl. Action Network v. EPA, 382 F.3d 575, 582-84 (5th Cir. 2004).
124. See, e.g., Skranak v. Castenada, 425 F.3d 1213, 1221 (9th Cir. 2005).
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in Table 2B, judges engaged in the Chevron step one ambiguity
query but refused to proceed to step two in light of a violation
of administrative law (e.g., a violation of APA's arbitrary and
capricious standard 125). These findings are consistent with re-
search noting that agencies more likely lost under step one
than two and nearly always won under step two, and issues
were resolved around one-third of the time under step one. 126
D. Using Chevron Strategically in Environmental Cases
Judges vote to achieve their preferred policy preferences, 127
and the data provide limited evidence that judges strategically
use Chevron step one to do so. As seen in Tables 3A through
3C, judges in each GHP category invoke ambiguity in Chevron
step one at rates between about 64% and 74%. These rates in-
crease as GHP scores increase. Conservatives (i.e., higher GHP
scores) more often find statutes ambiguous, leading to conser-
vative votes at a greater rate. On the other hand, the most lib-
eral GHP group invoked step one to declare statutes unambi-
125. See, e.g., Ne. Md. Waste Disposal Auth. v. EPA, 358 F.3d 936, 947-50
(D.C. Cir. 2004) ("Because the term 'class' is ambiguous, we would now ordinarily
take Chevron's second step and ask whether it was reasonable for the Agency to
construe that term as permitting subcategorization based on aggregate plant ca-
pacity. But because Industry Petitioners regard this case as governed by step one
of Chevron, their briefs do not dispute that, assuming subcategorization is permit-
ted at all, aggregate capacity is a reasonable criterion. Instead, they contend that
EPA failed to provide any explanation at all for subcategorizing on that basis. Be-
cause we ultimately find that argument dispositive, we pretermit our discussion
of Chevron and proceed directly to that challenge .... Nor can such a reference
satisfy the fundamental requirement of nonarbitrary administrative decisionmak-
ing: that an agency set forth the reasons for its actions. Without a readily acces-
sible statement of the agency's rationale, interested parties cannot comment
meaningfully during the rulemaking process. Nor can they, or the courts, deter-
mine whether the agency has acted capriciously or whether its statutory interpre-
tation is reasonable under Chevron's second step." (citations omitted)).
126. William R. Andersen, Chevron in the States: An Assessment and a Pro-
posal, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 1017, 1020 (2006) (analyzing Chevron-like deference in
the state courts and finding that "[iln terms of Chevron's so-called 'step analysis,'
deference usually was expressed as a 'Step Two' matter, the court finding that the
agency's interpretation was reasonable or permissible," and that "where the
agency lost, it was usually on 'Step One'-the court finding that the statute was
unambiguous and contrary to the agency interpretation."); Kerr, supra note 82, at
30-31 (finding that when the full two-step test was applied, the Chevron issue
was resolved at step one 38% of the time and at step two 62% of the time, and that
the interpretation was resolved at step one, agency views were upheld almost 42%
of the time and when resolved under step two, agency views were deemed reason-
able 89% of the time).
127. See supra Part II.
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guous to arrive at liberal outcomes. Since the dataset is de-
rived from years during the Bush Administration, these find-
ings are unsurprising. If liberals do not want to defer to a Re-
publican administrative agency, they must find the statute
unambiguous under Chevron step one. Similarly, conservative
judges simply find statutes ambiguous more often under step
one, leading to likely affirmance under step two. However,
these findings are statistically significant only at the ideologi-
cal extremes with the p-value less than 0.05 only in the most
liberal category.
Table 3A: Relationship Between Chevron
Directional Vote for GHP Range -1
Step One and
to -.033
Directional Vote
Step One Conservative Liberal Total
Ambiguous 42 33 75
56.00% 44.00% 100.00%
76.36% 53.23% 64.10%
Unambiguous 13 29 42
30.95% 69.05% 100.00%
23.64% 46.77% 35.90%
Total 55 62 117
47.01% 52.99% 100.00%
100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Fisher's exact = 0.012**
Table 3B: Relationship Between Chevron Step One and
Directional Vote for GHP Range -.033 to.033
Directional Vote
Step One Conservative Liberal Total
Ambiguous 25 23 48
52.08% 47.92% 100.00%
67.57% 67.65% 67.61%
Unambiguous 12 11 23
52.17% 47.83% 100.00%
32.43% 32.35% 32.39%
Total 37 34 71
52.11% 47.89% 100.00%
100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Fisher's exact = 1.000
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Table 3C: Relationship Between Chevron Step One and
Directional Vote for GHP Range .033 to 1
Directional Vote
Step One Conservative Liberal Total
Ambiguous 51 25 76
67.11% 32.89% 100.00%
80.95% 65.50% 73.79%
Unambiguous 12 15 27
44.44% 55.56% 100.00%
19.05% 37.50% 26.21%
Total 63 40 103
61.17% 38.83% 100.00%
100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Fisher's exact = 0.065*
Not surprisingly, more liberal judges find environmental
statutes textually clear because the statutes intrinsically con-
tain pro-environmental language (a type of environmental tex-
tualism128), and because environmental groups bring the vast
majority of these challenges. However, the data only mildly
suggest that conservatives use textualism under step one to
limit pro-environmental outcomes, or that liberals use step one
to encourage such results. This confirms a caveat to the find-
ings of Revesz, discussed in Part II. Revesz argued that ideo-
logical voting is dampened in environmental cases involving a
statutory challenge because methods and rules of statutory in-
terpretation are less malleable than procedural standards (e.g.,
"lack of adequate response to comments, lack of adequate ex-
planation in the rule's statement of basis and purpose, lack of
adequate notice or opportunity to comment, and improper ex
parte communication"). 129
128. Czarnezki, Shifting Science, supra note 25, at 421-22; see generally Rich-
ard J. Lazarus & Claudia M. Newman, City of Chicago v. Environmental Defense
Fund: Searching for Plain Meaning in Unambiguous Ambiguity, 4 N.Y.U. ENVTL.
L.J. 1 (1995); Mank, supra note 121.
129. Revesz, supra note 1, at 1729-31, 1729 n.33.
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Table 4: Relationship Between Judicial GHP Score
Category and Reverse/Affirm Agency Action
Vote
Scale Reverse Affirm Total
-i to
-0.33 51 83 134
-0.33
38.06% 61.94% 100.00%
48.57% 35.17% 39.30%
-0.33 to 23 64 87
0.33
26.44% 73.56% 100.00%
21.90% 27.12% 25.51%
0.33 to 31 89 120
25.83% 74.17% 100.00%
29.52% 37.71% 35.19%
Total 105 236 341
1 30.79% 69.21% 100.00%
100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Fisher's exact = 0.068*
Note: There are only 341 judicial votes here, rather than 347, as two
CERCLA enforcement cases did not involve the affimance or reversal
of agency action. 130
This raises any number of unanswered queries: Why is tex-
tualism not as helpful as conservatives might hope, for it would
allow statutory meaning to be locked in and prevent future
shifts in administrative policy? Is Chevron harder to manipu-
late than we might think? Might Chevron instead be used
strategically at step zero, or do judges use a diverse set of legal
tools (e.g., all the Chevron steps) to achieve their preferred pol-
icy outcomes? Or do judges, for the reasons stated by Revesz or
otherwise, simply not engage in strong strategic behavior when
dealing with principles of statutory interpretation (a conclusion
supported by the legislative history findings presented in the
next section)?
130. See Sierra Club v. Seaboard Farms, Inc., 387 F.3d 1167 (10th Cir. 2004);
Colorado v. Sunoco, Inc., 337 F.3d 1233 (10th Cir. 2003).
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Conservative judges do use Chevron deference to uphold
agency action challenged by environmental and public interest
groups, though the findings are statistically significant at only
90% (p < 0.1). Confirmed in Table 4, the data indicate that
judges with lower GHP scores (i.e., more liberal) are less likely
to affirm agency action (regardless of Chevron step used).
Consistent with all research, the data show that affir-
mance is more common than reversal of agency action. How-
ever, unlike the findings of Miles and Sunstein that show De-
mocratic judges were more likely than Republican judges to
defer to EPA action, these data find that affirmance of agency
action actually increases as GHP increases (i.e., more conserva-
tive judges are less likely to reverse the agency). On its face,
this finding may seem counterintuitive. Even though this
dataset includes many environmental agencies rather than just
the EPA, EPA action dominates the dataset. But again, per-
haps this is a product of the dataset used as one might expect
affirmance as GHP increases because the cases involve the
Bush Administration's EPA. During the time period of the
dataset, one might then expect that more liberal judges are less
likely to affirm agency action.
E. The Use of Legislative History
This section considers the interpretive tool of legislative
history. 131 The data show, as seen in Table 5, that invocations
of legislative history were made at a rate of 33.73%.
Judges that sign on to opinions that invoke legislative his-
tory are more likely to vote in a liberal direction by a small, but
statistically significant, margin (52.63% to 47.37%). Where leg-
islative history is not invoked, the outcome of the judicial vote
is more likely to be conservative (57.94%), at a slightly higher
rate than the overall rate of conservative vote (54.47%).
13 1. In addition to reading each individual opinion, to ensure that no citations
to legislative history were missed, cases in the database were searched for key leg-
islative history terms. See Czarnezki & Ford, supra note 10, at 862 n.95. The
search was as follows: DA(AFT 12/31/2002 & BEF 1/1/2006) & ("467 U.S. 837"
"104 S.CT. 2778") & ("LEGISLATIVE HISTORY' "COMMITTEE REPORT'
'IJ.S.C.C.A.N." "FLOOR DEBATE" "COMMITTEE STATEMENT"' "COMMITTEE
HEARING" "LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL" "H.R." "S.J. RES." "CONG. REC." "S.
RES." "H.R.J. RES." "S. DOC. NO." "S. REP.").
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Table 5: Relationship Between Invocation of Legislative
History and Directional Vote
Directional Vote
Invoked
Legislative Conservative Liberal Total
History
No 135 98 233
57.94% 42.06% 100.00%
71.43% 62.03% 67.15%
Yes 54 60 114
47.37% 52.63% 100.00%
28.57% 37.97% 33.73%
Total 189 158 347
54.47% 45.53% 100.00%
100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Fisher's exact = 0.067*
Interestingly, ideology as measured by the scaled GHP
score does not predict whether a judge will turn to legislative
history. 132 This mildly suggests that any judicial philosophy
toward legislative history may impact voting outcomes and
lends support for the legal model of judicial decisionmaking. It
also may mean that where good legislative history is available,
courts will use it, and it supports a pro-environmental position.
Taking these legislative history findings in context with reoc-
curring findings about the role policy preference plays in judi-
cial decisionmaking, it would appear that judges respond both
to the legal and attitudinal models. 133
132. An important caveat must be made here: This finding may be a result of
collegiality norms and the coding mechanism used. For example, a conservative
who signs on to a majority opinion written by a liberal invoking legislative history
will be counted as having invoked legislative history, even though he or she would
not have invoked the tool if he or she had written the opinion.
133. Humphries & Songer, supra note 3, at 217-18 ("The judges do not appear
to simply substitute their own policy preferences for those of the administrators
without regard for law. Variables that captured elements of the legal model were
also related to judicial decisions to a statistically significant degree. Taken to-
gether, the evidence suggests that the appeals courts appear to respond to both
legal concerns and political preferences. Thus, while it would be naive to believe
that politics is irrelevant in judicial review of agencies, it appears that the courts
do fulfill, at least in part, the normative expectations that they will constrain the
worst abuses of discretion by administrators by imposing the rule of law.").
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V. DOCTRINAL ANALYSIS
Doctrinal scholarship often makes sweeping claims about
the state of the law with few data points. Similarly, quantita-
tive empirical studies frequently provide analyses in the aggre-
gate absent any detailed analysis of the judicial opinions' ac-
tual written content. This Article seeks to do both, and this
Part complements the empirical findings above by providing a
doctrinal analysis of the judicial opinions that are part of the
quantitative dataset-the "data capture votes rather than opin-
ions. For the actual development of the law, the opinion mat-
ters a great deal."134
This Part discusses how judicial opinions are crafted when
deciding issues of statutory interpretation in environmental
law. Specifically, this Part addresses the diverse organiza-
tional structure of judicial opinions and the confusion sur-
rounding Chevron-when does the doctrine apply and what do
its steps actually mean in practice? In addition, it considers
the relationship between administrative deference and the
need for expertise in areas of scientific complexity.
A. Opinion Organization
Most judicial opinions in the dataset, prior to their discus-
sion and analysis sections, systematically lay out (in some
cases in rote fashion) the standards of review a federal appel-
late court uses to review an agency interpretation of environ-
mental law. 135 As discussed in Part I, the D.C. Circuit has a
more nuanced view of these standards, and the court's decision
in New York v. EPA clearly lays out in substantial detail how to
analyze such cases under Chevron steps one and two and arbi-
trary and capricious review. 136
134. SUNSTEIN, SCHKADE, ELLMAN & SAWICKI, supra note 10, at 65.
135. See, e.g., Rhinelander Paper Co. v. FERC, 405 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2005);
Harvey v. Veneman, 396 F.3d 28, 33-34 (1st Cir. 2005), superseded by statute, Ag-
riculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agen-
cies Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 109-197, § 796, 119 Stat. 2120, 2165 (2005),
as recognized in Harvey v. Johanns, 494 F.3d 237, 239 (1st Cir. 2007); Wilderness
Watch v. Mainella, 375 F.3d 1085, 1091 (11th Cir. 2004); Am. Chemistry Council
v. EPA, 337 F.3d 1060, 1063 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Defenders of Wildlife v. Hogarth,
330 F.3d 1358, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
136. 413 F.3d 3, 17-18 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
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In considering these challenges, we apply a highly defer-
ential standard of review. We may set aside a regulation
only if it exceeds EPA's "statutory jurisdiction, authority, or
limitations" or is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discre-
tion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." 42 U.S.C. §
7607(d)(9).
As to EPA's interpretation of the CAA, we proceed under
Chevron's familiar two-step process. See 467 U.S. at 842-
43, 104 S. Ct. 2778. In the first step ("Chevron Step 1"), we
determine whether, based on the Act's language, legislative
history, structure, and purpose, "Congress has directly spo-
ken to the precise question at issue." Id. at 842, 104 S. Ct.
2778. If so, EPA must obey. But if Congress's intent is am-
biguous, we proceed to the second step ("Chevron Step 2")
and consider "whether the agency's [interpretation] is based
on a permissible construction of the statute." Id. at 843, 104
S. Ct. 2778. If so, we will give that interpretation "control-
ling weight unless [it is] arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly
contrary to the statute." Id. at 844, 104 S. Ct. 2778.
Aside from statutory interpretation, we evaluate EPA's
actions based on traditional administrative law principles.
See Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 51 F.3d 1053, 1064 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
(noting that the CAA's review provisions are identical to
those in the Administrative Procedure Act). "Where, as
here, the issue before us requires a high level of technical
expertise, we must defer to the informed discretion of the
responsible federal agencies." Transmission Access Policy
Study Group v. FERC, 225 F.3d 667, 714 (D.C. Cir. 2000)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). After a
"searching and careful inquiry" into the facts, Am. Trucking
Ass'n v. EPA, 283 F.3d 355, 362 (D.C. Cir. 2002), we will
find EPA's actions arbitrary and capricious if the agency
has failed to "examine the relevant data and articulate a
satisfactory explanation for its action, including a rational
connection between the facts found and the choice made,"
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
463 U.S. 29, 43, 103 S. Ct. 2856, 77 L. Ed. 2d 443 (1983) (in-
ternal quotation marks and citation omitted), or has
reached a conclusion unsupported by substantial evidence,
Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Bd. of Governors
of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 745 F.2d 677, 683-84 (D.C. Cir.
1984). The standard of review "does not," however, "permit
us to substitute our policy judgment for that of the Agency."
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Bluewater Network v. EPA, 370 F.3d 1, 11 (D.C. Cir.
2004). 137
With some exceptions, 138 this is how most cases proceed-
the analysis section follows this pattern of moving through the
Chevron steps and onto the arbitrariness inquiry. As a result
of this step-by-step process, most courts maintain a judicial
finding of ambiguous statutory language and then a conclusion
of reasonableness under step two. 139 Other times, the statute
is unambiguous under step one. In Nat'l Mining Ass'n v.
Fowler, the court stated, "In this case, our analysis begins and
ends at Chevron step one. [National Historic Preservation Act]
section 211 unambiguously limits the Council to promulgating
regulations that 'govern the implementation of [section
106]."'140 In Gifford Pinchot Task Force v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife
Service, the court stated, "To answer that question, there is no
need to go beyond Chevron's first step in analyzing the permis-
sibility of the regulation; the regulatory definition of 'adverse
modification' contradicts Congress's express command." 14 1 And
sometimes the unambiguous text of the statute itself confers
broad discretion to the agency. 142
It is the rare case that finds the agency action to violate
step two. 143 If found to violate the arbitrary and capricious
standard of the APA, courts nearly always remand the case for
further consideration so the agency can further explain and
justify its decision. 144
137. Id.
138. See infra Part V.B.
139. See Am. Chemistry Council, 337 F.3d at 1063-66.
140. 324 F.3d 752, 758 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (internal citations omitted).
141. 378 F.3d 1059, 1069 (9th Cir. 2004).
142. City of Abilene v. EPA, 325 F.3d 657, 661 (5th Cir. 2003) ("The plain lan-
guage of § 1342(p) clearly confers broad discretion on the EPA to impose pollution
control requirements when issuing NPDES permits. . . .Thus, even if Chevron
deference is not warranted, the challenged permit conditions are within the EPA's
discretion.") (internal citations omitted).
143. See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv.,
421 F.3d 872 (9th Cir. 2005); Nuclear Energy Inst., Inc. v. EPA, 373 F.3d 1251
(D.C. Cir. 2004).
144. See, e.g., Bluewater Network v. EPA, 370 F.3d 1, 21 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (stat-
ing "that the Agency has not adequately explained its exercise of that discretion in
this case"); Ne. Md. Waste Disposal Auth., 358 F.3d 936, 950 (D.C. Cir. 2004);
Vigil v. Leavitt, 366 F.3d 1025, 1039-44 (9th Cir. 2004), amended by 381 F.3d 826
(9th Cir. 2004); Davis v. EPA, 336 F.3d 965, 978 (9th Cir. 2003).
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Despite the norm of a step-by-step process in the analysis
section, significant inconsistency in opinion organization exists.
The D.C. Circuit, in Northeast Maryland Waste Disposal Au-
thority v. EPA, engaged in the Chevron step one ambiguity
query but refused to proceed to step two in light of a violation
of administrative law (i.e., violation of APA's arbitrary and ca-
pricious standard). 145 And, quite frequently, courts address
the step two inquiry, but only in arguendo. 146  Consider also
these two quotes describing the Chevron inquiry.
"Pure" legal errors require no deference to agency expertise,
and are reviewed de novo. Questions involving an interpre-
tation of the FPA involve a de novo determination by the
court of congressional intent; if that intent is ambiguous,
FERC's conclusion will only be rejected if it is unreason-
able. 147
If agencies and legislators read ambiguous language differ-
ently, the agency wins under Chevron. 148
These are intriguing explanations of the Chevron doctrine
that raise difficult questions: Is statutory interpretation a dis-
tinct inquiry from determining congressional intent? 149 Is this
distinction lawful? Why should the resolution of agency confu-
sion trump the resolution of congressional confusion? What is
the role of plain meaning in determining congressional intent?
145. Ne. Md. Waste Disposal Auth., 358 F.3d at 947-50. Since Chevron Step 2,
was not invoked, this case was not included in Table 2B.
146. See City of Arcadia v. EPA, 411 F.3d 1103, 1106-07 (9th Cir. 2005) ("Even
if the language of the statute were not clear, we would uphold as reasonable the
EPA's interpretation of the Clean Water Act to require approval or disapproval of
California's TMDL.") (internal citations omitted); Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.
v. Abraham, 355 F.3d 179, 199 (2d Cir. 2004) ("Even assuming arguendo that the
plain language of the statute was ambiguous as to Congress's intent, which it is
not, the outcome here would be unchanged, as DOE's interpretation is not based
on any permissible construction of section 325(o)(1).").
147. Knott v. FERC, 386 F.3d 368, 372 (1st Cir. 2004) (internal citations omit-
ted).
148. Horn Farms, Inc. v. Johanns, 397 F.3d 472, 476 (7th Cir. 2005).
149. For a discussion of textualism versus intentionalism, see Andrew S. Gold,
Absurd Results, Scrivener's Errors, and Statutory Interpretation, 75 U. CIN. L.
REV. 25, 41-46 (2006). See also Linda Jellum, Chevron's Demise: A Survey of
Chevron from Infancy to Senescence, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 725 (2007).
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B. Doctrinal Confusions and Contradictions
When interpreting environmental statutes, courts run into
a number of doctrinal confusions, or at least contradictions
among the circuits, in determining the appropriate standards
of review for agency statutory interpretations.
1. Does Chevron Apply?
The issue of whether Chevron applies at all is "muddled" at
best, 150 though even if the doctrine does not apply the agency
action may be entitled to some modified form of deference. In
United States v. WR. Grace & Co., the Ninth Circuit stated,
"Following Mead, the continuum of agency deference has been
fraught with ambiguity. Our decisions understandably have
been conflicted as to whether Chevron deference only applies
upon formal rulemaking and whether lesser deference applies
in other situations." 151 Due to this intrinsic confusion in the
doctrine, the Grace court, like many other courts, considered
the statutory question under both a modified form of deference
and full Chevron deference, finding that either analysis would
elicit the same result. 152
Following Mead, courts typically employ the traditional
Chevron analysis when the agency interpretation arises from
formal procedures.153 Yet, the Ninth Circuit in Wilderness So-
150. See Schultz Bressman, supra note 47.
151. 429 F.3d 1224, 1235 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal citations omitted).
152. Id. at 1236-37; Bullcreek v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 359 F.3d 536,
541 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (internal citations omitted) (questioning whether Chevron
applies where more than one agency implements the same statute, but states this
issue is moot "because the result is the same whether the court applies de novo
review, deference under Skidmore v. Swift & Co., or Chevron deference"); Wilder-
ness Soc'y v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 316 F.3d 913, 921-22 (9th Cir. 2003) (fol-
lowing long discussion admitting the complexity, concludes Chevron applies, but
result is the same under Skidmore); see also Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v.
Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., 421 F.3d 872, 878-79 (9th Cir. 2005) (avoiding and
choosing not to resolve the question of whether Chevron applies, and instead as-
suming Chevron applies and finding impermissible construction of statute under
step one even under the deferential Chevron standard of review). For a discussion
of Chevron avoidance, see Note, The Two Faces of Chevron, 120 HARV. L. REV.
1562, 1579-80 (2007); Schultz Bressman, supra note 47, at 1464-69.
153. See, e.g., Lyon County Landfill v. EPA, 406 F.3d 981, 984 (8th Cir. 2005);
see also W.R. Grace, 429 F.3d at 1235 (citing Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v.
Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 980-82 (2005)) ("Nonetheless, in Brand X
the majority's language explaining Chevron is quite broad and does not come with
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ciety v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service seemed unwilling to speak
with such clarity, stating:
After Mead, we are certain of only two things about the con-
tinuum of deference owed to agency decisions: Chevron pro-
vides an example of when Chevron deference applies, and
Mead provides an example of when it does not. 154
Where Chevron deference does not apply, courts review the
agency action under the arbitrary and capricious standard, 155
and/or courts invoke some form of persuasive deference. 156
2. The Two-Step?
Oftentimes courts will not state Chevron's two-step test or,
even if it is stated, will not apply it. Professor Kerr, in his
analysis of the doctrine in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, found
that in 28% of the applications, courts applied Chevron by con-
densing the two-step test into a single question of whether the
interpretation was reasonable, and in these cases upheld
agency views 78% of the time. 157
For example, in NRDC v. National Marine Fisheries Ser-
vices, the Ninth Circuit combined both steps into a single rea-
sonableness inquiry after stating that Chevron requires deter-
mination of whether the agency decision is a "permissible
construction" and "reasonable interpretation" of the statute. 158
It seems, according to the court, that to violate one step is to
violate the other-"The interpretation of § 1854(e)(4) [of the
Magnuson- Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management
a proviso that the Chevron deference is limited to agency interpretations ex-
pressed through formal rulemaking.").
154. 316 F.3d at 921 (citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 237
n.18 (2001)).
155. See, e.g., WR. Grace, 429 F.3d at 1251-52 (Bea, J., concurring) ("Thus,
while I concur in the result of the majority's decision, I write separately to empha-
size that this court should stand ready to review separately the EPA's actions at
different locations at a removal site under the 'arbitrary and capricious' standard
stated in 42 U.S.C. § 96130)(2)."); Ala. Rivers Alliance v. FERC, 325 F.3d 290,
296-97 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
156. See, e.g., La. Envtl. Action Network v. EPA, 382 F.3d 575 (5th Cir. 2004);
Bullcreek v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 359 F.3d 536 (D.C. Cir. 2004); Colorado
v. Sunoco, Inc., 337 F.3d 1233, 1242-43 (10th Cir. 2003).
157. Kerr, supra note 82, at 30.
158. 421 F.3d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 2005) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).
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Act] stated in the 1998 [National Standards Guidelines], as ap-
plied in the 2002 quota, is not a permissible (or reasonable)
construction of the statute; it is directly at odds with the text
and the purpose of the Act." 159 Similarly, in Rhinelander Pa-
per Co. v. FERC, 160 the D.C. Circuit provided no real discussion
of step one, instead only determining whether the interpreta-
tion was permissible. The Rhinelander court stated, "We con-
clude that FERC's reliance on section 10(j)(1) reflects, at least,
a permissible reading of the statutory language-and, in par-
ticular, of the phrase 'affected by'-and should therefore be sus-
tained under the second step of the Chevron inquiry." 16 1
3. Chevron Step Two Versus the APA
Judges and students commonly conflate Chevron step two
and arbitrariness/hard look review. 162 For example, does the
APA's arbitrariness standard or hard look review simply in-
form the meaning of Chevron step two? 163 Or alternatively,
does Chevron inform review under the APA?164 Are hard look
review and step two doctrinally different, but functionally the
same? Or are they different both doctrinally and practically?
It is not uncommon for courts to note no difference between
Chevron step two and arbitrary and capricious review under
the APA. For example, in New York Public Interest Research
Group, Inc. v. Johnson, the Second Circuit stated, "However, if
we determine that the statute is ambiguous, in the second step
of the Chevron analysis, we defer to an agency's interpretation
159. Id.
160. 405 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
161. Id. at 6.
162. For a discussion of the conflation between Chevron step two and the hard
look doctrine, see Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsid-
ered, 72 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 1253 (1997).
163. See, e.g., Riverkeeper, Inc. v. EPA, 358 F3d 174, 184 (2d Cir. 2004) (inter-
nal quotations and citations omitted) ("[I]f, on the other hand, the statute is silent
or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is
whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute,
which is to say, one that is reasonable, not arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly
contrary to the statute.").
164. See, e.g., Harvey v. Veneman, 396 F.3d 28, 33-34 (1st Cir. 2005), super-
seded by statute, Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration,
and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 109-197, § 796, 119 Stat.
2120, 2165 (2005), as recognized in Harvey v. Johanns, 494 F.3d 237, 239 (1st Cir.
2007).
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unless it fails the APA's 'arbitrary and capricious' test. ' 165
Thus, in this way, the APA gives meaning to the Chevron doc-
trine, informing what "unreasonable" means under step two. 166
However, this view is inconsistent with those courts that
view the two standards of deference as doctrinally distinct. 167
Perhaps the varying levels of confusion in determining how to
review agency interpretations of environmental statutes (and
statutes in general) cause courts to frequently fall back into a
simple reasonableness inquiry. Like combining steps one and
two, a court in one case used the term "reasonable" throughout
the opinion to include reasonableness under step two, reason-
ableness under the APA, and reasonableness in light of exist-
ing precedent. 168
C. Tools of Statutory Interpretation
Courts employ a host of tools of statutory construction in
determining statutory meaning, 169 though there is no wide-
spread agreement on which tools of statutory construction can
or should be used under Chevron footnote nine. While nearly
every court agrees that the statutory text makes up part of the
165. 427 F.3d 172, 179 (2d Cir. 2005); see also N.Y. Pub. Interest Group v.
Whitman, 321 F.3d 316, 324 (2d Cir. 2003) ("When the question is not one of the
agency's authority but of the reasonableness of its actions, the 'arbitrary and ca-
pricious' standard of the APA governs.").
166. See Isle Royale Boaters Ass'n v. Norton, 330 F.3d 777, 781 (6th Cir. 2003)
(internal quotations and citations omitted) ('Under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natu-
ral Resources Defense Council, Inc., we first determine whether Congress has di-
rectly spoken to the precise question at issue; if it has not, we ask whether the
agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute. Section
706(2)(A) of the Administrative Procedure Act permits us to set aside the agency's
determination only if it is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or other-
wise not in accordance with law.").
167. See supra text accompanying notes 33-34.
168. See generally Sierra Club v. EPA, 353 F.3d 976 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
169. See, e.g., United States v. W.R. Grace & Co., 429 F.3d 1224, 1239 (9th Cir.
2005) (overall statutory scheme); United States v. Duke Energy Corp., 411 F.3d
539, 548, 550 (4th Cir. 2005) (intratextualism and plain language), vacated, Envtl.
Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1423 (2007); Forest Watch v. U.S. Forest
Serv., 410 F.3d 115, 117 (2d Cir. 2005) (plain language); Am. Chemistry Council v.
Johnson, 406 F.3d 738, 741-42 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (overall structure of the statute);
Rhinelander Paper Co. v. FERC, 405 F.3d 1, 6-7 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (dictionary);
Bluewater Network v. EPA, 370 F.3d 1, 13, 18 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (dictionary and
legislative history); Ne. Md. Waste Disposal Auth. v. EPA, 358 F.3d 936, 947 (D.C.
Cir. 2004) (dictionary); City of Abilene v. EPA, 325 F.3d 657, 660 (5th Cir. 2003)
(canon of constitutional avoidance).
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initial inquiry, 170 there is considerable debate as to whether
the plain language is the end of the step one analysis 17 1 or part
of a more holistic inquiry. 172 Should courts go beyond the
statutory text to find congressional intent contrary to the plain
meaning? 173 And if courts were to limit step one to the plain
meaning, should extratextual sources be available under step
two? 174
"Legislative history is one of the most common interpretive
aids available to judges, but judges, like legal scholars, dis-
agree about its proper use and even whether to use it at all." 175
170. See, e.g., Bluewater, 370 F.3d at 13 ('We begin our interpretation of the
provision with the 'assumption that legislative purpose is expressed by the ordi-
nary meaning of the words used."' (quoting Sec. Indus. Ass'n v. Bd. Of Governors,
468 U.S. 137, 139 (1984))).
171. Sierra Club v. Seaboard Farms, Inc., 387 F.3d 1167, 1169 (10th Cir. 2004)
(only looking at the plain language of the statute to determine if ambiguous). But
see Forest Watch v. U.S. Forest Serv., 410 F.3d 115, 117 (2d Cir. 2005) ("[T]he
plain meaning of language in a regulation governs unless that meaning would
lead to absurd results." (quoting Reno v. Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd., 45 F.3d 1375,
1379 (9th Cir. 1995))).
172. Citizens Coal Council v. Norton, 330 F.3d 478, 481 (D.C. Cir. 2003) ("In
this first analytical step, the courts use 'traditional tools of statutory interpreta-
tion-text, structure, purpose, and legislative history."' (quoting Pharm. Research
& Mfrs. of Am. v. Thompson, 251 F.3d 219, 224 (D.C. Cir. 2001))).
173. See Defenders of Wildlife v. Hogarth, 330 F.3d 1358, 1366-67 (Fed. Cir.
2003).
174. See Envtl. Defense v. EPA, 369 F.3d 193, 209 (2d Cir. 2004) (using a dic-
tionary as part of step two to determine reasonability after determining that text
was ambiguous); Safe Food & Fertilizer v. EPA, 350 F.3d 1263, 1269 (D.C. Cir.
2003) (stating that step two means "reasonable and consistent with the statutory
purpose" (quoting Am. Mining Cong. v. United States EPA, 907 F.2d 1179, 1186-
87 (D.C. Cir. 1990))).
175. Jason J. Czarnezki, William K. Ford & Lori A. Ringhand, An Empirical
Analysis of the Confirmation Hearings of the Justices of the Rehnquist Natural
Court, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 127, 151 (citing Bank One Chi., N.A. v. Midwest
Bank & Trust Co., 516 U.S. 264, 283 (1996) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) ("The text's the thing. We should therefore ignore
drafting history without discussing it, instead of after discussing it.")); see also
Archer-Daniels-Midland Co. v. United States, 37 F.3d 321, 323-24 (7th Cir. 1994)
(opinion by Posner, J.) ("Legislative history is in bad odor in some influential judi-
cial quarters, but it continues to be relied on heavily by most Supreme Court Jus-
tices and lower-court judges; and in the case of statutory language as technical
and arcane as that of the DISC provisions, the slogan that Congress votes on the
bill and not on the report strikes us as pretty empty." (citation omitted)); Stephen
Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L.
REV. 845 (1992)); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452-53 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
concurring); Citizens Coal Council, 330 F.3d at 484 ("As Judge Leventhal once ob-
served, reviewing legislative history is like 'looking over a crowd and picking out
your friends."' (quoting Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legis-
lative History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195, 214 (1983)));
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Yet, in the environmental context, legislative history is often
used to determine statutory meaning.
Judicial opinions also look to the underlying purpose of the
statute in determining the meaning of more specific statutory
provisions. Statutory purposes are often stated at the begin-
ning of the statutory text and can be quite broad and very am-
bitious. For example, the Congressional declaration in the
Clean Water Act is so ambitious that it states, "[I]t is the na-
tional goal that the discharge of pollutants into the navigable
waters be eliminated by 1985."176 Similarly, the Clean Air Act
seeks "to protect and enhance the quality of the Nation's air re-
sources so as to promote the public health and welfare and the
productive capacity of its population."'177 This section looks at
how federal appellate courts in environmental cases invoke a
statute's legislative history and underlying purpose.
For the cases in the dataset, courts commonly invoked leg-
islative history to determine statutory meaning, 178 including as
an appropriate tool of statutory interpretation under Chevron
step one. 179 At least in the context of environmental law, it
seems any fight against the use of legislative history has ulti-
mately failed, and courts view it as a proper tool of statutory
construction under Chevron. In fact, citing Supreme Court
precedent, 80 circuits have even acknowledged a need to some-
ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW
29-32 (Amy Gutmann ed., Princeton University Press) (1997).
176. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (2000).
177. 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1) (2000).
178. United States v. Duke Energy Corp., 411 F.3d 539, 548-49 (4th Cir. 2005);
Am. Chem. Council v. Johnson, 406 F.3d 738, 741 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Sierra Club v.
EPA, 353 F.3d 976, 988 (D.C. Cir. 2004); City of Waukesha v. EPA, 320 F.3d 228,
240-41 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (citing S. Rep. No. 104-169, at 35 (1995)); Wilderness
Soc'y v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 316 F.3d 913, 927-28 (9th Cir. 2003).
179. Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, Inc. v. U.S. Dept. of the Army, 398
F.3d 105, 109 (1st Cir. 2005) ("In this case, however, we find it unnecessary to
reach the question of Chevron deference because legislative history reveals, with
exceptional clarity, Congress's intent that Section 10 authority under OCSLA not
be restricted to structures related to mineral extraction.").
180. Id. at 109 n.3 ("Even were the text less ambiguous, a reviewing court may
consider legislative history to determine whether there is 'clearly expressed legis-
lative intention' contrary to [the statutory] language, which would require [the
Court] to question the strong presumption that Congress expresses its intent
through the language it chooses."); Train v. Colo. Pub. Interest Research Group,
Inc., 426 U.S. 1, 10 (1976) (citing United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns., 310
U.S. 534, 543-44 (1940)). But see Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep't of Educ.,
127 S. Ct. 1534, 1543 (2007) ("But what of the provision's literal language? The
matter is important, for normally neither the legislative history nor the reason-
ableness of the Secretary's method would be determinative if the plain language
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times examine the legislative history despite unambiguous
statutory text to avoid a result contrary to congressional in-
tent. 181 Other courts would like to consider legislative history
but have noted that the "legislative history is particularly un-
helpful" due to the complexity of environmental legislation. 1
82
Turning to discussing statutory purpose as an interpretive
tool, most cases in the dataset provide only boilerplate lan-
guage in describing the purpose and historical background of
the statute at issue. The opinions do not use the stated statu-
tory purpose to import meaning to the specific statutory provi-
sion at issue. 183 However, this is not always the case. Courts
invoke the statute's goals both to bring meaning to the statu-
tory text 184 and to confirm that the plain meaning of the text is
consistent with congressional intent. 185
of the statute unambiguously indicated that Congress sought to foreclose the Sec-
retary's interpretation. And Zuni argues that the Secretary's formula could not
possibly effectuate Congress' intent since the statute's language literally forbids
the Secretary to use such a method. Under this Court's precedents, if the intent of
Congress is clear and unambiguously expressed by the statutory language at is-
sue, that would be the end of our analysis." (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc., v. Natu-
ral Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984))).
181. Bullcreek v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 359 F.3d 536, 541 (D.C. Cir.
2004) ("[O]n rare occasions, it may suffice to overcome a result of the plain lan-
guage of the statute that is 'demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its draft-
ers."' (quoting United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989)); Sierra
Club v. EPA, 353 F.3d 976, 988 (D.C. Cir. 2004); Isle Royale Boaters Ass'n v. Nor-
ton, 330 F.3d 777, 784 (6th Cir. 2003) ("When a statute's text is unambiguous,
there is ordinarily no need to review its legislative history. However, there are
those 'rare cases in which the literal application of a statute will produce a result
demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters .... " (citation omitted)
(quoting United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989))).
182. United States v. W.R. Grace & Co., 429 F.3d 1224, 1240 (9th Cir. 2005).
183. See, e.g., Sierra Club, 353 F.3d at 979-80; Public Citizen, Inc. v. EPA, 343
F.3d 449, 452-53 (5th Cir. 2003); see also Envtl. Defense v. EPA, 369 F.3d 193,
196 (2d Cir. 2004) ('To put this case in context, and drawing on legislative history,
we essay a very brief summary of what the legislative and the executive branches
of government have aimed to accomplish since 1963 when Congress enacted the
Clean Air Act, the first modern environmental law.").
184. See Harvey v. Veneman, 396 F.3d 28, 38 (1st Cir. 2005) ("Since the Act is
silent on these issues, we must conclude that Congress committed the questions to
the Secretary's discretion and assess the challenged portions of the Rule for their
reasonableness in light of OFPA's overall scheme." (citing Penobscot Air Servs.,
164 F.3d 713, 719 (1st Cir. 1999); United States v. Haggar Apparel Co., 526 U.S.
380, 392 (1999) ("If ... the agency's statutory interpretation fills a gap or defines
a term in a way that is reasonable in light of the legislature's revealed design, we
give that judgment controlling weight."))).
185. City of Arcadia v. EPA, 411 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 2005) ('This plain
reading of section 1313 is consistent with the basic goals and policies that under-
lie the Clean Water Act-namely, that States remain at the front line in combat-
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Courts can invoke the statutory purpose under step one to
overturn agency action. In Gifford Pinchot Task Force v. U.S.
Fish & Wildlife Service, the Ninth Circuit used the statutory
purpose under Chevron step one to strike down a U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service interpretation of the Endangered Species Act
that would allow, according to the court, complete elimination
of critical habitat necessary for species recovery. This "offends
the ESA because the ESA was enacted not merely to forestall
the extinction of species (i.e., promote a species survival), but to
allow a species to recover to the point where it may be de-
listed." 186
D. Environmental Science and Law
"Law and science have had a troubled marriage."1 8 7 These
difficulties are furthered by the limited institutional capacity of
judges to understand scientific principles. At Supreme Court
oral arguments for Massachusetts v. EPA, an appeal from the
D.C. Circuit's decision in a case in this Article's dataset regard-
ing the EPA's authority and duty to regulate greenhouse gases,
Justice Scalia, in a dialogue with the Deputy Attorney General
of Massachusetts, readily admitted that judges are not experts
in environmental science.
Justice Scalia: "Mr. Milkey, I had-my problem is precisely
on the impermissible grounds. To be sure, carbon dioxide is
a pollutant, and it can be an air pollutant. If we fill this
room with carbon dioxide, it could be an air pollutant that
ing pollution." (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (2000) ("It is the policy of the Congress
to recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of
States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution .... "); 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (2000)
(stating that "nothing in this chapter shall ... preclude or deny the right of any
State or political subdivision thereof ... to adopt or enforce . . . any standard or
limitation respecting discharges of pollutants" unless the standard is less strin-
gent than an existing standard))).
186. 378 F.3d 1059, 1069-70 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1532(3) (2000);
Sierra Club v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Servs., 245 F.3d 434, 438 (5th Cir. 2001)).
187. Czarnezki, Shifting Science, supra note 25, at 409 (citing Oliver Houck,
Tales from a Troubled Marriage: Science and Law in Environmental Policy, 302
SCI. 1926 (2003)); see also David Adelman, Scientific Activism and Restraint: The
Interplay of Statistics, Judgment, and Procedure in Environmental Law, 79
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 497, 498-99 (2004) (describing the difficulties in using sci-
ence in environmental policy); Holly Doremus & Dan A. Tarlock, Science, Judg-
ment, and Controversy in Natural Resource Regulation, 26 PUB. LAND &
RESOURCEs L. REV. 1 (2005); Holly Doremus, Science Plays Defense: Natural Re-
source Management in the Bush Administration, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 249 (2005).
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endangers health. But I always thought an air pollutant
was something different from a stratospheric pollutant, and
your claim here is not that the pollution of what we nor-
mally call 'air' is endangering health. That isn't, that
isn't-your assertion is that after the pollutant leaves the
air and goes up into the stratosphere it is contributing to
global warming."
Mr. Milkey: "Respectfully, Your Honor, it is not the strato-
sphere. It's the troposphere."
Justice Scalia: "Troposphere, whatever. I told you before
I'm not a scientist."
(Laughter.)
Justice Scalia: "That's why I don't want to have to deal with
global warming, to tell you the truth." 188
It is not surprising that courts may be reluctant to defini-
tively rule on issues involving expertise in environmental sci-
ence and may defer to administrative agencies in such matters.
In fact, the recognition that "[j]udges are not experts in the
field" provided the Court with a rationale for the Chevron deci-
sion itself.18 9 Perhaps Congress, when discussing who should
determine environmental policy, thought "that those with great
expertise and charged with responsibility for administering the
provision would be in a better position to do so." 190 Thus,
courts may be more willing to (and some argue should 91 ) defer
188. Transcript of Oral Argument at 22-23, Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct.
1438 (2007) (No. 05-1120), available at www.supremecourtus.gov/oral-arguments/
argumenttranscripts/05-1120.pdf.
189. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865
(1984).
190. Id.
191. See Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The Executive's Power to Say
What the Law Is, 115 YALE L.J. 2580 (2006); see also STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING
THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION 61 (1993) (calling for
creation of a health and environmental administrative agency that would be "mis-
sion oriented, seeking to bring a degree of uniformity and rationality to decision
making in highly technical areas, with broad authority, somewhat independent,
and with significant prestige").
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when issues of environmental policy or science are involved,
and are less willing to do so otherwise. 192
The cases in the dataset support the notion that courts will
defer where scientific expertise is required-a recognition of
both present and future institutional capacity as agencies may
later choose to change their reasonable interpretation as scien-
tific information evolves. 193 (However, this does not mean that
courts must abdicate their responsibility to interpret and en-
force clear statutory text. 194) The Supreme Court itself has rec-
ognized the relationship between science and administrative
deference. In Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. NRDC, the Court
wrote,
[A] reviewing court must remember that the Commission is
making predictions, within its area of special expertise, at
the frontiers of science. When examining this kind of scien-
tific determination, as opposed to simple findings of fact, a
reviewing court must generally be at its most deferential. 
195
This statement is cited by a number of cases in the data-
set, 196 and the appellate courts have explicitly recognized that
"predictions at the frontiers of science" are better left to the
administrative agencies. 197 The D.C. Circuit once stated, "We
give particular deference to the EPA when it acts under 'un-
wieldy and science-driven' statutory schemes like the Clean Air
192. Cf. Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 364 (1998)
(overruling agency finding in case regarding polling employees about unioniza-
tion).
193. For a discussion and use of expertise as a rationale for Chevron deference
in the courts of appeals, including a small empirical inquiry into the D.C. Circuit,
see The Two Faces of Chevron, supra note 152.
194. See generally Czarnezki, Shifting Science, supra note 25.
195. 462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983) (citing Indus. Union Dep't v. Am. Petroleum Inst.,
448 U.S. 607, 656 (1980) (plurality opinion); id. at 705-06 (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing)).
196. See, e.g., United States v. W.R. Grace & Co., 429 F.3d 1224, 1245 (9th Cir.
2005) ("[W]e will not delve further to second-guess the underlying data absent a
showing of specific evidence that the EPA's conclusion were not warranted." (cit-
ing Baltimore Gas, 462 U.S. at 103)); Ass'n of Irritated Residents v. EPA, 423 F.3d
989, 997 (9th Cir. 2005) ("This is a determination that is scientific in nature and is
entitled to the most deference on review." (citing Baltimore Gas, 462 U.S. at 103));
Cent. Arizona Water Cons. Dist. v. EPA, 990 F.2d 1531, 1539-40 (9th Cir. 1993).
197. Envtl. Def. v. EPA, 369 F.3d 193, 204 (2d Cir. 2004) ("A reviewing court
must remember that the agency is making predictions at the frontiers of science.
In 'examining this kind of scientific determination, as opposed to simple findings
of fact, a reviewing court must generally be at its most deferential."' (quoting Bal-
timore Gas, 462 U.S. at 103)).
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Act," 198 and other courts seem particularly happy to defer to
evaluations of complicated science within agencies' areas of ex-
pertise. 199 Thus, both the complexity of the statutory scheme
and underlying science help determine the appropriate scope of
deference.
In United States v. W.R. Grace & Co., discussed above,200
the Ninth Circuit decided whether the EPA had properly char-
acterized cleanup activities under CERCLA as a removal action
rather than a remedial action. 20 1 In addition to citing Balti-
more Gas,20 2 the court used the scientific nature of the question
to award the EPA highly persuasive Skidmore deference.
Grace contests the denomination of the action as a removal
by cherry-picking discrete cleanup activities which, stand-
ing alone, might fall within the ambit of a remedial action.
We refrain from slicing and dicing the EPA's single, cohe-
sive removal action into a myriad of fractured parts. Such
atomization would undermine the EPA's scientific and ad-
ministrative expertise by requiring us to second-guess
whether, for example, the excavation of soil at the local ele-
mentary school was a remedial action because 1000 cubic
yards of soil was removed when perhaps removal of less soil
198. Bluewater Network v. EPA, 372 F.3d 404, 410 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (quoting
Husqvarna AB v. EPA, 254 F.3d 195, 199 (D.C. Cir. 2001)); see also Baltimore
Gas, 462 U.S. at 103 (explaining that a court is "at its most deferential" when an
agency is "making predictions, within its area of special expertise, at the frontiers
of science"); Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 56 (1976) (citing Train v.
NRDC, 421 U.S. 60, 75 (1975)) (according "great deference" to the EPA's construc-
tion of the Clean Air Act); Greenbaum v. EPA, 370 F.3d 527, 533-534 (6th Cir.
2004) ("If Congress has been either silent or ambiguous about the 'precise ques-
tion at issue,' then a reviewing court must defer to the agency's interpretation if it
is reasonable." (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc., v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984))); id. at 534 ("To uphold EPA's interpretation of a statute,
the Court need not find that it is the only permissible construction that EPA
might have adopted but only that EPA's understanding of this very complex stat-
ute is a sufficiently rational one to preclude a court from substituting its judgment
for that of EPA." (quoting Southwestern Penn. Growth Alliance, 144 F.3d 984, 988
(6th Cir. 1998))); BCCA Appeal Group v. EPA, 355 F.3d 817, 825 (5th Cir. 2003)
(citing Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 256 (1976)).
199. BCCA Appeal Group, 355 F.3d at 824 ("A reviewing court must be 'most
deferential' to the agency where, as here, its decision is based upon its evaluation
of complex scientific data within its technical expertise." (citing Baltimore Gas,
462 U.S. at 103)); City of Waukesha v. EPA, 320 F.3d 228, 247 (D.C. Cir. 2003)
(giving "an extreme degree of deference to the agency when it is evaluating scien-
tific data within its technical expertise" (internal quotation omitted)).
200. See supra Part V.B.1.
201. 429 F.3d 1224, 1226 (9th Cir. 2005).
202. 462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983).
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or less drastic measures could have been employed to coun-
teract the immediate threat. Instead, we take a more com-
prehensive view of the administrative record in concluding
that the EPA's response was a removal action. 203
Not surprisingly, this principle of scientific deference was
also invoked when defendants attempted to contest the actual
scientific process.
The disputes between Grace and the EPA regarding testing
methodology and data analysis are exceedingly complex.
The administrative record includes, for instance, the EPA's
response to Grace's contention that the EPA "inappropri-
ately calculated PCMEs [phase contrast microscopy equiva-
lents] if those findings are going to be compared to the
OSHA PEL [Occupational Safety & Health Administration
permissible exposure limits]." We are not scientists, nor do
we intend to play armchair EPA administrator. But we are
judges and it is our role to evaluate the record evidence
against the standard of review. We defer to the EPA's rea-
soned judgment. 20 4
Courts are well aware of their limitations in addressing is-
sues of scientific expertise. The federal intermediate appellate
courts, in environmental cases, have built upon the Supreme
Court's statements in both Chevron and Baltimore Gas to cre-
ate strong principles of deference when environmental science
is involved. This is consistent with the recently made argu-
ment that the courts of appeals, based on reasonable interpre-
tations of Supreme Court precedent, are relying heavily on
agency expertise in their deference decisions. 20 5 Courts have
exerted such deference regardless of whether Chevron defer-
ence is required or whether some lesser form of deference is
permitted. Where scientific expertise is involved, due to the
203. W.R..Grace, 429 F.3d at 1237.
204. Id. at 1245-46 (citing Colorado v. Sunoco, Inc., 337 F.3d 1233, 1243 (10th
Cir. 2003) ("[Skidmore] deference seems particularly appropriate where an action
reasonably can be classified as both 'removal' and 'remedial' under CERCLA's
complex definitional provisions.")).
205. The Two Faces of Chevron, supra note 152, at 1563 (stating that, com-
pared to the Supreme Court, "in the circuit courts, expertise plays a more central
role in the deference decision" and that "a noticeable pattern emerges in the way
that the courts of appeals apply Chevron: they have come to rely on agency exper-
tise in more contexts, and more heavily, in deciding the degree of deference to pro-
vide to agency interpretations than the Supreme Court does.").
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highly persuasive findings of the environmental agency and
strength of deference employed, it seems there is little differ-
ence in outcome whether Chevron or Skidmore deference is of-
fered up as the legally appropriate standard, 206 a qualitative
conclusion that is not readily ascertained from the type of
quantitative results available earlier in this Article.
CONCLUSION
This Article makes four basic claims about judicial voting
in cases of environmental statutory interpretation that ulti-
mately lead to two possible conclusions, one complementary
and the one contradictory. The claims are as follows. (1) Con-
sistent with other research, judges vote in their perceived ideo-
logical directions. (2) The Chevron doctrine, when employed in
environmental cases, works as expected-courts find most
statutory provisions ambiguous and then affirm agency action.
(3) The data provide very limited evidence that Chevron step
one is used strategically to achieve desired policy preferences.
(4) At some level law itself matters, as invocations of legislative
history more often correspond to a liberal vote, yet ideology
does not predict this invocation.
These findings are arguably contradictory, and perhaps
open to other explanation. How can judges simultaneously be
206. Deference is also granted under the APA's arbitrary and capricious re-
view. See, e.g., Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc. v. EPA, 399 F.3d 486, 516-17 (2d Cir.
2005); Gifford Pinchot Task Force v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 378 F.3d 1059,
1066 (9th Cir. 2004) (in upholding USFWS habitat models under the APA, the
court noted that "[a]n agency's scientific methodology is owed substantial defer-
ence . . . '); Riverkeeper, Inc. v. EPA, 358 F.3d 174, 184 (2d Cir. 2004) ("[W]e ac-
knowledge that we lack the EPA's expertise when it comes to scientific or techni-
cal matters ...."); Crutchfield v. County of Hanover, 325 F.3d 211, 217-18 (4th
Cir. 2003) ("Our concern with the district court's decision begins with the stan-
dard of review. Under the deferential standard established by the Administrative
Procedure Act, federal courts can overturn an administrative agency's decision if
it was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with law. Although our inquiry into the facts is to be searching and careful, this
court is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency. Particu-
larly with environmental statutes such as the Clean Water Act, the regulatory
framework is exceedingly complex and requires sophisticated evaluation of com-
plicated data. We therefore do not sit as a scientific body in such cases, meticu-
lously reviewing all data under a laboratory microscope. Rather, if the agency
fully and ably explain[s] its course of inquiry, its analysis, and its reasoning suffi-
ciently enough for us to discern a rational connection between its decision-making
process and its ultimate decision, we will let its decision stand." (citations and
quotations omitted)).
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ideological and legal? Perhaps when the two are not in conflict,
or perhaps sometimes (or often) judges hold legal preferences
higher than policy preferences. One could certainly imagine a
judge deciding a case based on stare decisis even though as a
matter of policy the judge would rather overturn precedent.
However, law and politics are not easily disentangled where le-
gal preferences lead to the same result as preferred policy pref-
erences. Future research may examine periods of different and
divergent political party control of the administration and judi-
ciary.
In addition, the data look only to the strategic use of Chev-
ron step one, but what of the strategic use of Chevron step zero,
arbitrary and capricious review, 20 7 other interpretive tools, or
the determination of how much expertise is needed to address
the problem at hand? Since most research models (with some
exceptions) lend support to the existence of ideological voting,
is it that diverse legal avenues, a hodgepodge of legal mecha-
nisms ("pick a card, any card"), are being used strategically to
achieve preferred policy preferences? Judges are not system-
atically using a single mechanism such as Chevron step one
(though the data suggests it may be used sometimes) to achieve
their preferred outcomes. Thus, the "muddled" nature of Mead
and Chevron may lead to strategic options allowing for "judicial
policy space" even though Chevron would presumably create
''agency policy space."
But this Article's findings are equally complementary.
Taking its findings regarding the use of legislative history
based on judicial philosophy and limited strategic use of Chev-
ron based on ideology, in context with recurring findings of the
role policy preferences in judicial decisionmaking, it would ap-
pear that judges respond both to the legal and attitudinal mod-
els. 208 Thus, legal choices such as whether to defer to an
207. Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of Arbitrariness Re-
view, _ U. CHI. L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2008).
208. Humphries & Songer, supra note 3, at 217-18 ("The judges do not appear
to simply substitute their own policy preferences for those of the administrators
without regard for law. Variables that captured elements of the legal model were
also related to judicial decisions to a statistically significant degree. Taken to-
gether, the evidence suggests that the appeals courts appear to respond to both
legal concerns and political preferences. Thus, while it would be naive [sic] to be-
lieve that politics is irrelevant in judicial review of agencies, it appears that the
courts do fulfill, at least in part, the normative expectations that they will con-
strain the worst abuses of discretion by administrators by imposing the rule of
law.").
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agency and judicial philosophy about the legitimacy of certain
interpretive tools, as well as ideology, are key aspects to judi-
cial decisionmaking. 20 9
This Article and the descriptive data it presents also sug-
gest a number of avenues for future research about the envi-
ronmental law docket in the United States. First, more time
must be devoted to understanding environmental litigation
outside the D.C. Circuit and, more specifically, to learning why
certain cases are filed in certain jurisdictions when not man-
dated by statute (e.g., environmental hot spots, venue prefer-
ences). Second, in recognition of the Supreme Court's 2005
Brand X decision, will fewer courts affirm agency action under
Chevron step one in order to give ample "policy space" to agen-
cies in the future?2 10 Third, what is the true nature of judicial
preferences? In other words, even if a judge may be, at times,
ideologically motivated, would he or she prefer to reach a cer-
tain environmental outcome or affirm the presidential admini-
stration with which he or she aligns? 211 For example, if an in-
dustry group challenges an interpretation of the Bush
Administration's EPA, does a conservative judge prefer to vote
with the "anti-environmental" industry group or the "conserva-
tive" Republican administration? Furthermore, might a pref-
erence toward executive deference really be a legal preference,
not an ideological one? 212 Future work should consider both
the nature of the presidential administration in power and the
challenging litigants. Fourth, judges have exhibited a strong
willingness to defer to agency action when environmental sci-
entific expertise is required. What are the implications for
Chevron deference or other forms of deference in other areas of
law that deal with scientific or technological complexities? 213
Finally, empirical scholarship of environmental and ad-
ministrative law requires, in practice and methodology, a more
sophisticated understanding of judging in environmental cases
209. See Kritzer et al., supra note 91, at 1-3, 23.
210. Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern
Skidmore Standard, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1235, 1304-10 (2007).
211. See Kritzer et al., supra note 91.
212. See Sunstein, supra note 191.
213. See Verizon Tel. Cos. v. FCC, 292 F.3d 903, 909 (D.C. Cir. 2002)
("[D]eference is particularly great where .. .the issues involve 'a high level of
technical expertise in an area of rapidly changing technological and competitive
circumstances."' (quoting Sprint Commc'ns Co. v. FCC, 274 F.3d 549, 556 (D.C.
Cir. 2001))).
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and a more nuanced model of judicial decisionmaking in gen-
eral.2 14 Such a model will depend not only on political ideology
but also on how law creates a set of rules by which decisions
are made (e.g., the Chevron doctrine), the malleability of those
rules (e.g., how many Chevron steps can one choose from), and
the facts given to the court (e.g., complex statutes or scientific
findings requiring expert analysis).
214. James Gibson, From Simplicity to Complexity: The Development of Theory
in the Study of Judicial Behavior, 5 POL. BEHAVIOR 7, 32 (1983) ("Judges' deci-
sions are a function of what they prefer to do, tempered by what they think they
ought to do, but constrained by what they perceive is feasible to do.").
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